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ABSTRACT
The United States Navy has completed the initial flight test of a Reconfigurable
Control Law System (RCLAWS) on the F/A-18C. The purpose of reconfigurable control
is to allow for the safe operation of an aircraft that has experienced a sudden change in
aircraft dynamics resulting from aircraft damage or flight control effector damage. The
RCLAWS utilized during this flight test are novel in that they are designed to augment
the production flight control system instead of replacing it. In order to reduce
verification and certification requirements, this retrofit reconfigurable methodology
supplements pilot commands to compensate for undesirable aircraft dynamics instead of
manipulating control surfaces directly. Through comparison of the aircraft’s actual
response to model data of the aircraft’s desired response, the RCLAWS determines what
commands need to be applied to produce the desired aircraft response.
Flight test data have been collected to determine the viability of the in-line retrofit
reconfigurable control method. Although flight data indicate a modest improvement
within the limited flight test envelope, simulation analysis has indicated that the retrofit
RCLAWS provide substantial improvements for more aggressive failures. Simulation
shows RCLAWS has proven to reduce the aircrew workload in a recent catastrophic
failure present in the F/A-18 community and provide predictable aircraft dynamics for a
safe recovery.
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presented within this document are the opinion of the author and should not be
interpreted as that of the Department of Defense, the United States Navy, VX-23 or the
University of Tennessee Space Institute.
Public Release, 265SPR-133.06. DoD Directive 5230.24 – DISTRIBUTION
STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
BACKGROUND
During the early days of flight, aircrew controlled aircraft motion via cables
and/or rods that connected the flight control surfaces to the pilot controls. With the
advent of the jet era, the control surfaces required more force to displace due to higher
dynamic loads and larger control surfaces. These changes necessitated the advent of the
hydraulic-mechanical flight control system. These systems utilized the mechanical
advantage of hydraulics to drive the actuators of the control surfaces. The actuators,
however, were still physically connected to the pilot controls, usually via push/pull rods
or cables.
When the electronics era ensued, engineers were determined to develop a method
to replace the heavy, unreliable cables and rods with an electronic flight control system.
The first Digital Fly By Wire (DFBW) aircraft was flown on May 25, 1972. The test bed
for this ground breaking technology was a National Aeronautic and Space Administration
(NASA) F-8 Crusader that had been extensively modified with an electronic flight
control system controlled via a digital computer (NASA TN-7843, 1974). Now, instead
of cables and rods, the flight control actuators were only connected to the pilot control
inputs via wires and a flight control computer.
Most modern military high performance aircraft from the F-16 Falcon and the
F/A-18 Hornet to the F/A-22 Raptor and even many commercial aircraft have utilized
this fly by wire technology. Fly by wire technology has allowed additional innovation in
the field of flight controls. In earlier, conventionally controlled aircraft, when a flight
control surface failed due to actuator failure or aircraft damage, the aircrew had to either
quickly learn to fly the new, unknown flight control system or attempt to egress the
aircraft prior to crashing. With fly by wire technology and an understanding of control
system modeling and response, the aircrew now has other options.
Reconfigurable flight control is one such option upon which aircrew can now rely
upon. Reconfigurable flight control techniques endeavor to eliminate undesired motion
(e.g., axis coupling) that can result from aircraft damage or flight control failure. Failures
have occurred that have left aircraft in a flyable state. However, pilots could not always
control and safely land the aircraft as a result of insufficient time to learn the vastly
different dynamics of the new system. The benefits of flight control reconfiguration to
aid the pilot in these situations have been well established (Page, et al, 2006 and
Tomayko, 2003). Due to the considerable verification and validation efforts required to
certify flight control software, however, the techniques have been slow to transition to
production platforms. To help address the certification issue, some researchers have
started examining retrofit reconfigurable control methods that are designed to upgrade,
rather than replace, the existing control laws of current production aircraft.
The retrofit control architecture recently tested at Naval Air Station (NAS)
Patuxent River is one such system. Through a Small Business Innovative Research
(SBIR) contract, Barron Associates, Incorporated (BAI) developed the control algorithms
and supported the United States Navy during all phases of testing throughout this
program. This architecture is unique because it affects reconfiguration by modifying the
pilot control stick and rudder commands instead of control surfaces directly. By
comparing sensor data of the aircraft’s actual response to model data of the aircraft’s
1

nominal response, the Reconfigurable Flight Control Laws (RCLAWS) determine what
additions need to be made to the pilot’s commands to produce the desired aircraft
response.
RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL AND THE F/A-18C
A large part of the design philosophy behind most combat aircraft, including the
F/A-18C, is survivability. Unfortunately, reconfigurable flight control was in its infancy
during the development and testing of the F/A-18. Even without reconfigurable control
as defined today, the developers were able to provide aircrew several means to control
the aircraft during flight control or sub-system failures.
The F/A-18C flight control system (FCS) is a fly by wire system that contains
multiple back-up modes to the primary control augmentation system (CAS) such as direct
electrical link (DEL) and mechanical link (MECH). DEL is a back-up mode that
contains both a digital and analog operating mode for aileron and rudder control. DEL
allows aircraft control in all three axes in the event of a CAS failure. If the DEL mode
fails, the FCS secondary back-up mode is MECH, which provides a direct mechanical
linkage to the horizontal stabilators for pitch and roll control. When operating in any of
these degraded modes, the aircraft is much more susceptible to pilot induced oscillations
(PIO), sideslip excursions and large pitch transients. The author’s experience with these
modes has been limited to the simulator. Even though flying qualities are severely
degraded in some cases, the control of the aircraft was not in question and a safe,
simulated landing was made each time as long as the aircraft was flown in the
recommended envelope.
The F/A-18C also has failure modes for the leading edge flaps (LEFs) and trailing
edge flaps (TEFs). However, unlike DEL or MECH modes which provide roll, pitch and
yaw control during CAS failures, when a failure exists that affects automatic flap
scheduling, they are commanded to a known flyable configuration. For example, with a
single LEF failure with the flap in the AUTO position (up), the LEF and TEF symmetric
commands will freeze, however the differential LEF commands will continue and allow
the operational LEF to schedule as appropriate. In flaps HALF or FULL, the failed LEF
will freeze, while the remaining LEF and TEFs will schedule normally. In the event of a
catastrophic failure in the hydraulic drive unit shaft, the LEFs are designed to fail to
approximately 5 degrees leading edge up (LEU) by use of a specifically designed
transmission and brake. Testing has shown that all of these LEF failure cases are
controllable and a safe landing can be made. However, events in the past several years
have shown that in some cases the transmission fails to stop the LEF at 5 degrees LEU
and the results have been catastrophic. More discussion will be devoted to this topic
during the real world application section, chapter 8. TEF failure modes are much simpler
and result in both the TEFs being commanded to zero degrees. Although this results in
higher than normal approach speeds and degraded approach characteristics in pitch and
roll, this configuration is considered controllable.
In addition to the FCS having multiple back-up modes, the hydraulic (HYD)
system that drives the control surfaces in their normal operating mode is also highly
redundant. The F/A-18C has two separate HYD systems that drive the flight control
surfaces. Every flight control surface with the exception of the speed brake is backed up
on both HYD systems. In addition, each HYD system, denoted HYD 1 and HYD 2, is
2

split into two circuits denoted A and B, i.e., HYD 1A, HYD 1B, HYD 2A and HYD 2B.
The F/A-18C HYD system incorporates further redundancy in the form of a reservoir
level sensing (RLS) system. The RLS system attempts to prevent excessive loss in
hydraulic fluid and thus actuator functionality by attempting to isolate the leak in a single
circuit. For example, if there is a leak in the right LEF actuator that is normally driven by
the HYD 2A system, the RLS system will secure the A circuit at approximately 60%
reservoir capacity, but will allow HYD 2B to continue to function. If this did not secure
the loss of fluid (which it should in the example of the right LEF), when the reservoir
reaches 32%, the A circuit will open and the B circuit will close in an attempt to isolate
the leak. At 4%, both circuits come back on line and all fluid will be lost in that system.
With the combination of the two separate HYD systems, the individual circuits in each
system and the RLS system, the F/A-18 is flyable with the vast majority of hydraulic
system emergences as shown in Figure 1. The author’s experience during hydraulic
malfunctions, both in flight and in simulation, resulted in degraded handling qualities due
to the sometimes non-symmetric flight control surface deflections and the resulting
coupling in the other axes.
When the author was initially approached with this project, his first response was
that the F/A-18 already had multiple back-up modes and redundancy built into the basic
flight controls and airframe systems, therefore it appeared to be unnecessary to test
reconfigurable flight control on an F/A-18. The author certainly did not expect to
discover vastly improved handling qualities. Fortunately, after further study and
completion of multiple simulator and flight tests, the author realized that his initial
opinion that reconfigurable flight control was inapplicable to the F/A-18C and other
highly redundant fly by wire aircraft was absolutely incorrect. This paper will discuss the
methods to safely and efficiently test a new in-line retrofit module. In addition, it will
discuss the results and the added benefits of reconfigurable flight control on extremely
redundant aircraft such as the F/A-18C, including a real world application.

3

Figure 1: F/A-18C Hydraulic Malfunction Reference Chart
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Chapter 2: Background of Retrofit Reconfigurable Flight Control
Systems
OVERVIEW OF RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS
In December 1989, NASA Ames Research Center performed the first
demonstration of real time reconfiguration on a high performance fighter aircraft (Stewart
and Shuck, 1990 and Tomayko, 2003). These flights were flown on the NASA F-15
Highly Integrated Digital Electronic Control (HIDEC) Flight Research aircraft. This
demonstration utilized the inherent fault detection capabilities built into modern fly by
wire aircraft and took advantage of the excess control power and surface displacements
provided by the aircraft’s large flight envelope to modify flight control surface
displacement to preserve aircraft stability in the event of a failure. This demonstration
was known as the Self-Repairing Flight Control System (SRFCS). This method,
however, required knowledge of flight control system health to respond correctly to any
malfunctions.
Reconfiguration via adaptive control presents an alternative to failure detection
that does not require knowledge of the characteristics of the failures. In 1996, an F-16
flying a Self-Designing Controller (SDC) demonstrated an adaptive approach using a
time-varying model of the aircraft dynamics in coordination with a model used to show
the desired response to drive the control surfaces to achieve the desired aircraft state
(Ward, et al, 1998). The most recent example of reconfigurable flight took place from
1996 to 1999 when NASA’s F-15 Advanced Control Technology for Integrated Vehicles
(ACTIVE) aircraft flew a follow on to the SFRCS project. This project was referred to as
the Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) (Monaco et al, 2004 and Tomayko, 2003).
This system was similar to the SDC demonstration in that prior knowledge of flight
control failures was not required for reconfiguration. In addition, the F-15 ACTIVE
aircraft incorporated a propulsion-controlled aircraft (PCA) system that allowed the
aircraft to land without utilizing the flight control system (Burcham et al, 1999). Each
reconfigurable flight control system introduced in these examples replaced the preexisting flight control system, however, and typically required significant aircraft
modifications.
Even with numerous demonstrations and advancing technologies, these systems
have not been integrated into newer aircraft. Several reasons exist for the slow
acceptance of reconfigurable flight controls, including the expense associated with
integration into a known flight control system and the costs and time associated with the
verification and validation of this new technology. Furthermore, aircraft designers have
been unwilling to depart from the proven systems already installed in the aircraft (Page,
et al, 2006). Several companies have attempted to mitigate the risks associated with
reconfigurable flight control by introducing an add-on, retrofit module that modifies
instead of replacing existing flight controls. This modification delivers the benefits of
reconfigurable flight without the expense, time and risks associated with replacing entire
flight control systems. There are currently two methods to implement a retrofit
reconfigurable control system, parallel and in-line, which are described below.
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PARALLEL RETROFIT RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS
One method to implement a retrofit control law is possible through the
modification of the output of the existing (production) control law, as shown in Figure 2.
Because the retrofit control module can perform its calculations at the same time as the
production control laws, this method is referred to as “parallel” implementation. In the
standard implementation of the parallel system, instead of the retrofit control laws
performing their calculations independent of, and simultaneous with, the existing control
laws, the retrofit control module utilizes the output of the production control laws, as
depicted by the dashed line in Figure 2. The control module then augments the output of
the production controller to actuate the control surfaces (Monaco et al, 2004). The
greatest advantage of the parallel architecture is that there are typically more
aerodynamic surfaces (flight control effectors) that can be manipulated to achieve the
desired aircraft response than aircrew controls (flight control inceptors). For example,
including only aerodynamic control surfaces (without engine effects and excluding the
speed brake), the F/A-18C has ten surfaces that can either individually or in combination
affect the flight path of the aircraft and only a simple control stick and rudder pedals for
aircrew inputs. Therefore, the parallel architecture has a greater capability to handle a
wider variety of aircraft failures than similar architectures that do not directly control the
aerodynamic control surfaces. For this reason, much of the reconfigurable flight control
testing has concentrated on the parallel method. The Self-Designing Controller, flown in
1996 on the Variable-Stability In-Flight Simulator Test Aircraft (VISTA) F-16 operated
by Calspan exemplifies a successful parallel retrofit control system (Ward, et al, 1998).
During this experiment, the aircraft landed successfully with a simulated elevon failure.
In spite of these benefits, this method also has created complications in the
verification and validation of these systems. The parallel architecture allows the retrofit
control laws to overwrite the production control laws if necessary to maintain the desired
state. Therefore, one must verify and validate both the production control laws and the
retrofit control laws instead of only the production control laws
IN-LINE RETROFIT RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS
Another method of implementation a retrofit control law is also possible through
the modification of the pilot input prior to the existing control laws, as shown in Figure 3.
This implementation of retrofit control laws requires that the retrofit control module
perform its calculations prior to the existing control laws, hence this method is referred to
as an “in-line” or “series” approach. From aircraft sensor data, the retrofit control
module modifies the control inputs prior to the production control laws to achieve the
desired aircraft system response. Thus, one major advantage of the in-line architecture is
that the production control laws are still in control of the control surfaces. As a result,
any safety features such as command limiting, structural filtering and safety logic are still
in effect (Monaco et al, 2004).
The in-line method allows for slightly easier verification and validation as a
retrofit system because production control laws still retain end control of the aircraft.
Unfortunately, however, this implementation creates several deficiencies. As stated
above for the parallel method, there are typically more control surfaces (effectors) than
control inputs (inceptors). Therefore, the in-line method is less powerful because it has
less capability to handle a range of aircraft failures than the parallel method. In essence,
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if the pilot cannot command the desired flight control surface response, then the in-line
retrofit reconfigurable method can not accomplish it. The in-line method was utilized for
the test flight program described in this paper.
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Chapter 3: Description of Test Airplane and Test Equipment
F/A-18C DESCRIPTION
The F/A-18C airplane is a single-seat, high performance, twin engine, supersonic
fighter and attack airplane manufactured by McDonnell Douglas Corporation (now
Boeing, St. Louis), as shown in Figure 4. The airplane is characterized by moderately
swept, variable camber mid-mounted wings, twin vertical stabilizers mounted forward of
the horizontal stabilators (canted outboard 20 degrees), and wing leading edge extensions
mounted on each side of the fuselage from the wing roots to just forward of the
windscreen. The airplane is configured with full span leading edge flaps, inboard trailing
edge flaps, and outboard ailerons on each wing. The flight control system consists of two
digital flight control computers with two 701E processors that utilize a full authority
control augmentation system to operate the hydraulically driven control surfaces. Pilot
interface for the flight control system is through a conventional, center mounted control
stick, rudder pedals and dual engine throttles on the left console. Spring cartridges in all
axes are designed to provide the pilot control stick and rudder feel. The F/A-18C
airplane is powered by two General Electric F404-GE-400 or -402 augmented turbofan
engines.
FLEET SUPPORT FLIGHT CONTROL COMPUTERS
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM DESIGN
The Fleet Support Flight Control Computer (FSFCC) system, originally
designated the Production Support Flight Control Computer (PSFCC), consists of a set of
modified F/A-18A/B/C/D Flight Control Computers (FCCs) (Carter and Stephenson,
1999 and NAWCAD RTR, 1999). The modified computers contain an additional 1750A
processor in each channel of each FCC. This arrangement allows engineers to flight test
experimental flight control laws on the 1750A processor. A key safety feature of this
arrangement is that the 701E processor is available at all times to resume control of the
aircraft with a known, certified set of control laws. The FSFCC provides the United
States Navy with the capability to flight test experimental flight control laws in a very
cost efficient manner by reducing the upfront validation and verification requirements
normally associated with flight critical software. In addition, they allow for increased
flexibility to make rapid software changes without extensive regression testing. These
modified FCCs replace standard FCCs and interface with the rest of the FCS components
in the same manner as the standard system, as shown in Figure 5.
The FSFCCs are designed to automatically return control to the standard 701E
processor based on aircraft envelope checks and flight control system health status. In
addition to the automatic disengage capability, the pilot can also manually revert to the
standard 701E processor via the Autopilot Disconnect Switch (ADS), more commonly
known as the paddle switch, at any time. Features of the FSFCC system include:
a. Baseline Version 10.1 (v10.1) flight control laws always available to resume
control of the aircraft.
b. Compatible with any fleet F/A-18A/B/C/D with Mission Computer (MC) dial-afunction (DAF) software.
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FIGURE 4: Three View of the F/A-18A/B/C/D Hornet
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c. No special hardware or additional sensors, interfaces or buses required
d. Uses existing DAF for module activation and parameter modification.
e. Allows easily programmable test-specific disengage criteria as well as manual
disengage capability through the existing paddle switch.
f. Supports rapid prototyping through Ada software development.
HARDWARE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The FSFCC hardware architecture is the same as that used for NASA’s F/A-18
High Angle-of-Attack Research Vehicle (HARV) program (Carter and Stephenson,
1999). Lockheed Martin Control Systems (LMCS) modified a standard F/A-18 701E
FCC chipset to accommodate a 40 MHz PACE (Performance Semiconductor
Corporation, Sunnyvale, CA) 1750A processor, an analog #6 board and an additional
analog I/O #2 board. The analog #6 and analog I/O #2 boards are not currently used but
are available for future growth. The 701E is always responsible for and retains complete
and direct control of all actuators through the Actuator Signal Management (ASM)
module. The 701E is always operating in parallel with the 1750A so it may resume
control of the aircraft at any time. The system is identical to a standard F/A-18 FCC
executing v10.1 control laws when 1750A processor is not engaged. When the 1750A is
engaged, the 701E Operational Flight Program (OFP) uses a transient free switch to
replace the 701E actuator commands with the 1750A commands.
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SOFTWARE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The 701E changes required for FSFCC affected the Executive, Input Signal
Management (ISM), ASM, Data Management, Built-In-Test (BIT), and the inner loop
control laws. A diagram of some of these components along with the interface to the
1750A is shown in Figure 6.
Changes were made to the 701E Executive to control 1750A arming and
engaging, as well as modification to the cross-channel data link (CCDL) transfer tests.
ISM was modified to execute CCDL transfer of FSFCC specific parameters. ASM was
modified to allow 1750A commands to be used instead of the standard 701E commands.
Fade logic was also added to ASM for mode transitions between 701E and 1750A
commands providing transient suppression. Data Management was changed to provide
additional FSFCC specific 1553 data. Periodic BIT (PBIT) was modified to test the
Dual-Port Random Access Memory (DPRAM) and the 701E/1750A interface.
Communication between the 701E and 1750A is accomplished through the
DPRAM interface. Selected sensor input data, cockpit discrete states, 701E commands,
surface positions, and FCC internal variables are placed in DPRAM by the 701E for use
by the 1750A. The 1750A writes its actuator commands, status and 1553 data into
DPRAM for use by the 701E and transmittal on the 1553 data bus.
HARDWARE ARM/ENGAGE/DISENGAGE INTERFACES
Operation of FSFCC requires the use of several aircraft components. From the cockpit,
the pilot utilizes the Digital Display Indicator (DDI) to load FSFCC table and row codes
into the MC. The pilot can specify FSFCC table and row numbers by entering a four to
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Figure 6: FSFCC 701E/1750A Software Architecture
Source: Meloney, D. and Doyle, M., “Test Plan for F/A-18 Retrofit Reconfigurable
Control System Flight Test,” SA-05-04-3266C, April 2005.
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six letter code using the DAF B, C, and D buttons on the Flight Test Flight Control
System (FTFCS) display, shown in Figure 7. Each FSFCC table and row number
combination designates either parameter modification or module activation. The 1750A
processor can then be armed by pressing the DAF A button. The Nose Wheel Steering
(NWS) button is used to engage the 1750A processor, and the pilot can confirm
engagement on the DDI. The paddle switch is used by the pilot to manually disengage
the FSFCC. If the system automatically disengages, the Master Caution light is
illuminated, an FCS caution is displayed on the DDI, and an audible tone is heard in the
pilot's headset. The MC and the FSFCC process the pilot's DDI inputs and feeds them to
the 1750A processor via the 1553 bus and the DPRAM.
COMMAND FADING
Command fading is accomplished using transient free switch logic from the
standard F/A-18A/B/C/D control laws. A linear transition between the 701E to the
1750A command occurs over a preset fade rate. A representation of the command fading
that occurs following disengage is presented in Figure 8. The same command fading
occurs for the engagement sequence (701E to 1750A) as disengage (1750A to 701E).
Default fade rates for all 1750A surface commands was 1.1 seconds in FSFCC Version
3.1.6 OFP and subsequent utilized for this testing.
During engagement of the FSFCC, 701E trim values are transferred to the 1750A
and used to prevent large transients during engagement. The 701E sets trim values to
zero after the transfer. However, upon disengaging the 1750A, the trim values are not
transferred back to the 701E, so a trim transient resulted on several occasions. This
transient was on the order of +/- 1g.
VERSION 3.1.6 FSFCC MODULES
FSFCC software version 3.1.6 contains three modules: the RCLAWS, the Slim
Control Laws, and the Failure Simulation modules.
RCLAWS MODULE
The RCLAWS module makes comparisons between the aircraft sensor outputs
and the predicted response to the pilot’s inputs. When active, the RCLAWS modifies the
pilot’s inputs to better produce the intended aircraft response. For example, a pure
longitudinal stick pull would normally result in a pure pitch response. In the event of
stabilator damage or failure, however, there will be additional lateral coupling. The
RCLAWS will add lateral command as necessary to produce a pure pitch response,
within the capability of the degraded system. When inactive, the RCLAWS module
passes the pilot’s commands directly to the Slim Control Laws.
The RCLAWS module is comprised of three separate components that work in
combination to provide the reconfiguration (Ward and Monaco, 2005). The first
component is a state space reference model that defines the desired aircraft motion in
response to pilot control inputs. High fidelity simulation data was utilized to generate
low-order equivalent system transfer functions that yielded pitch and roll rate response to
a control input. The hardware implementation of the reference model in the FSFCCs
allows for an 80Hz update, which is the same update rate as the standard FCCs
commands.
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The second component is a state space representation of the aircraft’s actual flight
dynamics. Onboard aircraft variables such as angular rate information, angle of attack
(AOA), and stick positions are utilized in this algorithm. Due to limitations of the
FSFCCs the aircraft dynamics model is updated at a rate of 5Hz. The low update rate
when compared to the reference model and the FCC commands will be discussed in
chapter 5, simulation results.
The final component of the RCLAWS module is the receding horizon optimal
controller used to determine the appropriate gain scheduling for reconfiguration. This
controller is the utilized to determine the appropriate increments to the control stick
inputs for the reference model to match the aircraft dynamics model for a given control
stick input. The gain scheduling is implemented at 10Hz in the flight test hardware.
In addition to affecting pilot stick outputs, the RCLAWS has the capability to
regulate uncommanded yaw motion by adding increments about a zero pedal command.
Because of the computational limitations of the research flight hardware, namely
processor capabilities of the 1750A research processor, the pedal reconfiguration is not
included in this derivation of the reconfigurable control laws, but is instead implemented
as a fixed-gain regulator about a zero reference. This is capable in an aircraft such as the
F/A-18C due to the fact that rudder pedal inputs during flight are typically associated
with extremely dynamic maneuvering vice navigational maneuvering. The stick only
RCLAWS configuration and the stick/pedal configuration were tested extensively during
simulation testing; those simulation results are discussed in chapter 5. The decision to
incorporate a stick only RCLAWS configuration and the rudder pedal modification is
discussed during flight test results, chapter 7, and the conclusions and recommendations,
chapter 9.
SLIM CONTROL LAWS
The Slim Control Laws are a functional duplicate of the inner loop of the
production v10.1 control laws. The 1750A processor’s resources, however, are
extremely limited, and it cannot host both the entire v10.1 OFP and the RCLAWS. To
get around this limitation, engineers at Barron Associates, Inc. and Boeing, St. Louis,
have rewritten the inner loop control laws as the “slim control laws” (Meloney and
Doyle, 2005). Because the 701E is continuously calculating many of the FCC internal
variables in parallel with the 1750A, the requirement for the 1750A to calculate the same
parameters has been eliminated. Instead of independently calculating all of the internal
variables, the 1750A receives many of them over the DPRAM from the 701E, effectively
sharing the workload. In addition, the outer loop control laws are not replicated in the
slim control laws, and therefore functions such as speed brake compensation and
autopilot are not supported. The Slim Control Law module is always active when the
1750A processor is engaged.
FAILURE SIM MODULE
The Failure Sim module takes outputs from the Slim Control Laws module and
passes them back to the 701E processor’s output signal selection logic. When active, the
Failure Sim module fails a selected control surface by overriding the Slim Control Laws’
command with a command to a fixed position at a rate not greater than 8 degrees/second.
The “failure” is introduced at least 2 seconds after the FSFCC is engaged. The control
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surface and the position to which the surface is commanded are determined by which
FSFCC table and row numbers have been chosen by the pilot through the DAF interface.
When inactive, the Failure Sim module passes the Slim Control Laws output directly to
the 701E processor’s output signal selection logic.
FSFCC OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
TABLE/ROW NUMBER SELECTION, ENGAGEMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT
FSFCC row and table numbers are specified to modify parameters, set modules as
active or inactive, and set disengage limits for the FSFCC. FSFCC table/row number
combinations are specified by selecting a series of DAF table/row numbers. The MC
sends the values stored in the selected DAF table/row to the FSFCC, and the FSFCC
converts these values to an FSFCC table/row number combination. To operate the DAF,
the FTFCS display must be enabled on the DDI (Figure 7). With the FTFCS display
enabled, push tiles 2 through 5 are labeled D through A, respectively. The pilot specifies
an FSFCC table/row combination by pressing a sequence of buttons B through D. Table
B-1 specifies valid sequences and describes the function of each.
When the pilot depresses these three buttons (B, C, and D) in a sequence, the
values of the corresponding table/row numbers will be sent to the FSFCC, and the
FSFCC will store the sequence until a value of 1 (button A) is received. Upon receiving a
1, the FSFCC will convert the previous values (four to six of them) to the corresponding
FSFCC table/row combination. If the table/row combination is found to be valid for
arming, the ARM cue will be displayed on the FTFCS display. The ARM cue will not be
displayed if the FSFCC table/row modifies an internal parameter. In the event of a
parameter modification, the pilot will receive no feedback after pressing button A, but the
engineers in the ground station will be able to verify that the correct parameter has been
changed to the correct value. In addition, the pilot has no indication of the correct
sequence is being entered. The pilot shall confirm with the ground station that the code
corresponding to the correct table and row numbers has been entered prior to arming the
1750A processor.
When the pilot selects a valid, armable code and presses the “A” button, the
1750A processor will arm, and the selected code will only be visible on the FSFCC
display at RTPS. Engagement of the FSFCC can be initiated by depressing the NWS
button. When engaged, a “1 2 3 4” symbol will be displayed on the FTFCS display in
place of the ARM cue, shown in Figure 7
The FSFCC may be disengaged at any time by depressing the paddle switch. The
system may also automatically disengage when either an automatic disengage limit is
reached or an engagement requirement is no longer satisfied. This results in an FCS
caution displayed on the DDI, a Master Caution indication, and an audible tone in the
pilot’s headset.
701E ARM/ENGAGE/DISENGAGE LOGIC
A top level block diagram of the arm, engage, and disengage logic for FSFCC is
presented in Figure 9. The first step in this process is to make an arm request. The pilot
initiates this by depressing the DAF “A” button to initiate a valid, armable sequence. The
1750A monitors this MC interface and then sends an arm request to the 701E. Once the
16
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Control System Flight Test,” SA-05-04-3266C, April 2005.
1750A is successfully armed, a pilot engage request can be made using the NWS button.
Again, the 1750A monitors the NWS button and sends an engage request to the 701E. A
pilot disarm or disengage request can be made at any time via the paddle switch, which is
monitored by the 701E. Automatic disarm or disengage can be triggered by 701E
monitoring of arm or engage criteria. In addition, the 1750A may set a disarm or
disengage discrete, which results in reversion to the 701E processor.
In order to engage the FSFCC, selected Envelope Criteria and System Status
Criteria must be met. Envelope Criteria for FSFCC engagement is defined for the
parameters shown in Table B-1. System Status Criteria is defined in Table B-2. FSFCC
engage limits for each Envelope Criteria parameter can be selected with the appropriate
sequence in Table B-3.
Any or all Envelope Engage Criteria parameters may be disabled either prior to or
in flight. Once disabled, those parameters will not cause the 1750A to disengage until the
Envelope Engage Criteria is explicitly re-enabled by the pilot. In addition, each
Envelope Engage Criterion has predefined, selectable upper and lower limits. The intent
of the automatic disengage is to serve as an additional safety measure. The automatic
disengage limits are intended to keep the aircraft from entering potentially unsafe parts of
the flight envelope; they are not intended to prevent the aircraft from unintentionally
entering otherwise safe parts of the envelope.
FSFCC/RCLAWS OPERATING MODES
As previously described, there are three separate modules within the FSFCC. The
RCLAWS module and the Failure Simulation (sim) module can each be active
independently; the Slim Control Laws module is always active. The active/inactive
options of the three modules create four unique modes that can be engaged within the
FSFCC. Each mode is selected by following the DAF procedure described above. The
DAF entries are converted within the FSFCC to a table and row number pair and then
passed into the 1750A processor through DPRAM. A summary of the four unique modes
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and the table and row numbers used in the FSFCC is presented in Table 1. Each mode
will be evaluated as described in simulation test planning, chapter 4. A detailed summary
of all valid table and row numbers along with a description of each mode selection is
given in Table B-3
FSFCC Mode

Table 1: FSFCC Table and Row Numbers
Module Status
Table Number

Basic Replication Mode
Retrofit Control Mode
Basic Replication with
Failures
Retrofit Control with
Failures

RCLAWS inactive
Failure Sim inactive
RCLAWS active
Failure Sim inactive
RCLAWS inactive
Failure Sim active
RCLAWS active
Failure Sim active
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0

Row
Number
0

21

0

22

0 - 25

23

0 - 25

Chapter 4: Simulation Test Planning
OVERVIEW
Simulation testing was broken down into two categories, software testing and
hardware in the loop simulation (HILS). The Non-Real-Time (software) testing utilized
the Modular Six Degree of Freedom (ModSDF) analysis program located at Boeing
Aircraft in St. Louis, Missouri, and the Controls Analysis and Simulation Test Loop
Environment (CASTLE) program located at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland. The
software piloted simulations were conducted at the Boeing Simulation Facility in St.
Louis, Missouri. The hardware in the loop testing was accomplished at the Manned Flight
Simulator (MFS) complex at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland.
TEST ENVELOPE
Figure 10 presents the test envelope and test point conditions that were flown. In
addition to the test points shown, a test point at 10,000 feet and 1.20 Mach number was
evaluated during the NRT and piloted software simulations. Further discussion of the
Class B envelope is included in chapter 6, Flight Test Planning.
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TEST CONFIGURATION
Test points were performed in the following configurations: 1) Cruise (CR),
defined as landing gear and flaps up; 2) Powered Approach (PA), defined as landing gear
down and flaps full; 3) PA1/2, defined as gear down and flaps half; and 4) Simulated
Single Engine (SSE), defined as gear down, flaps half and one throttle at flight idle.
During the testing, the test team recommended that the speed brakes remain retracted
whenever the 1750A processor was engaged because the slimmed control laws did not
include speed brake compensation.
NRT SIMULATION METHOD OF TEST
NRT test maneuvers consisted of straight and level flight, throttle steps, doublets
(all axes), loaded rolls, cross control inputs and general flying qualities. Failure
simulations included single and multiple control surface failures. For CASTLE
simulations, all ten control surfaces on the F/A-18C were considered in various test
scenarios as shown in Figure 11. Figure A-4 sets forth the particular CASTLE test matrix
used during the testing. The simulation results will be discussed in chapter 5.
PILOTED SIMULATION AND HILS METHOD OF TEST
The test points consisted of pitch doublets, pitch attitude captures, bank-to-bank
rolls, heading captures, and tracking tasks at each test condition. Pitch doublets, pitch
attitude captures, bank-to-bank rolls and heading captures were combined into an
Integrated Test Set (ITS). In addition, the pilots performed an in-flight refueling task
during the manned software simulation. Heading captures were performed at the test
team’s discretion, because early simulator results indicated that little value was added by
performing these maneuvers. Simulated wave offs were performed in lieu of the tracking
task at 16,000 feet to assess PA handling qualities. The complete test matrices and
DMOT are presented in Table B-4 and appendix 4, respectively. Each test point was
performed in each of the following FSFCC modes:
1. FSFCC engaged without RCLAWS and without simulated
failure. This mode provided baseline Handling Quality Ratings (HQRs)
for the replicated portion of the F/A-18C control laws running on the
1750A research processor.
2. FSFCC engaged with RCLAWS and without simulated failure.
The results of this test were compared to those from the preceding mode to
ensure the validity of the aircraft model in the RCLAWS module, and to
ensure non-interfering (zero) inputs without a failure.
3. FSFCC engaged without RCLAWS and with simulated failure.
This mode provided information on how the aircraft handles after a
failure, but without the advantages of flight control reconfiguration. After
the failure engaged, the pilot attempted to trim the rates to zero before
maneuvering. The pilot repeated this point for each of the several
different failures engaged.
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Figure 11: NRT Simulation and Piloted Simulation Control Surface Failures
Source:Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and
Flight Testing of Adaptive Flight Control Systems for Existing Aircraft,” Draft Report,
March 2006.
4. FSFCC engaged with RCLAWS and with simulated failure.
This test showed the benefits of the reconfiguration technique. The pilot
also repeated this mode for multiple different failure scenarios.
The left stabilator, left aileron and left rudder , as shown in Figure 11, were failed
for various maneuvers during the piloted software simulation. For HILS and flight test
points that include simulated failures, the test team commanded one of two surfaces (right
stabilator or right aileron, as shown in Figure 12) to a fixed position. The rational behind
choosing failures on different sides of the aircraft during testing was to demonstrate
RCLAWS flexibility. For simulated stabilator failures, the FSFCCs commanded the
surface to a fixed position within a range of ±6 degrees about the 1g trim position. For
simulated aileron failures, the FSFCCs fixed the surface within a range from 25 degrees
trailing edge up (TEU) to 42 degrees trailing edge down (TED), not to exceed ±30
degrees from the 1g trimmed position prior to FSFCC engagement. For a simulated
rudder failure, the FSFCCs commanded the surface to a fixed position of ±4 degrees
(UA), or ±30 degrees (PA) about the 1g trim position.
The pilots flew test points in the order of increasing risk. PA configuration events
were tested before those in SSE. Pilots also completed ITSs before other test points for a
given configuration. Test points followed the build up in FSFCC modes, following the
order presented in the preceding paragraph. When the Failure Sim Module was active,
simulated failures were built up in severity: aileron failures were simulated first, followed
by stabilator failures for the CR configuration. During the PA test points, stabilator
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Figure 12: HILS and Flight Test Control Surface Failures
Source:Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and
Flight Testing of Adaptive Flight Control Systems for Existing Aircraft,” Draft Report,
March 2006.
failures were tested prior to aileron failures. The reason for the two different approaches
was that with an aileron failure in the PA configuration, the ailerons are normally in a
drooped position. The drooped position, coupled with a zero degree aileron failure would
allow for very little roll contribution in the positive direction for the functional aileron.
Therefore, in PA, the aileron failure scenarios were more severe than the stabilator
failures.
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Chapter 5: Simulation Test Results
SOFTWARE TESTING RESULTS
The software testing proved invaluable in the development and implementation of
the final version of the retrofit system utilized for the HILS and flight testing. Numerous
changes to the original design of the RCLAWS algorithms were made to allow
integration into the 1750A research processor. For example, the desired update rate for
all retrofit control computations is 80 Hz. However, the processor capacity restricts the
update rates for aircraft model to 5 Hz and the control system gains to 10 Hz.
Fortunately, software testing in the CASTLE simulator and the piloted simulations at the
Boeing Simulation Facility allowed for full 80 Hz capability. In addition, the software
simulations allowed for use of an integrated stick and pedal retrofit algorithm instead of
just a stick only architecture that was implemented for the HILS and flight test portions.
Lastly, the software simulations allowed for use of sideslip as a variable in the dynamics
model of the aircraft. Unfortunately, the F/A-18C cannot easily compute sideslip on the
aircraft for implementation into the retrofit algorithm. Instead, the algorithm used yaw
rates provided by the onboard rate gyros. Simulation showed that for the flight test
envelope, the exclusion of sideslip from the algorithm was not significant. In addition,
without flight test clearance requirements, the simulation test envelope was not restricted
to the modified Class B envelope. Testing was conducted at a wide range of dynamic
pressures and altitudes to document the strengths and weaknesses of the in-line retrofit
method.
With these limitations removed, the test team was able to observe a more realistic
implementation of the in-line method. The bulk of the testing consisted of approximately
1,800 test cases. Test cases typically consisted of 13 single and multi-axis maneuvers
with 23 failure modes at six different conditions. Figure A-3 shows the scoring criteria
utilized in the CASTLE simulations. Figure A-4 and Figure A-5 show the CASTLE
simulation results for two of the six flight conditions tested. The six flight conditions are
shown in Figure 10. As shown in the figures, the CASTLE results are extremely positive.
The results showed that, as expected, the potential of reconfiguration provided an
improvement in flying qualities increased as airspeed increased. This can be partly
attributed to the increased control power associated with higher dynamic pressures. In
addition, with higher dynamic pressure points, the control surfaces are more faired when
a failure is inserted, effectively allowing the operational control surface increased
deflection in both directions to counter the undesired coupling.
With the software piloted simulation, the pilots were asked to perform the
maneuvers described in chapter 4 and the DMOT, appendix D, and then assign HQRs for
with and without retrofit enabled. The HQR scale is described in Figure A-1. Two pilots
were used for these tests. Boeing’s chief test pilot at the time (Pilot A) and a Navy, fleet
experienced F/A-18 test pilot (Pilot B) were the aircrew that performed the piloted
simulation evaluation. Overall, Pilot A and Pilot B rated the nominal F/A-18 as an HQR
1 or 2 aircraft and an HQR 2 or 3 aircraft, respectively, dependent on task and flight
environment. With failure modes engaged and retrofit not engaged, both aircrew rated
the flying qualities between HQR 5 and 7. However, once the retrofit system was
engaged, Pilot A assessed the handling qualities as an HQR 2, and Pilot B assessed an
HQR of 2 to 3.
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Figure A-2 shows the combined HQRs for both piloted simulation flights. Figure
13 and Figure 14 show the HQRs for all of Pilot B’s maneuvers. During the in-flight
refueling task, Pilot B commented “The elimination of the constant left stick input and
the roll coupling were a sure improvement. It was hard to see a degradation in tanking
resulting from any yaw coupling that may have been present.” (Rouland, 2002)
RUDDER PEDAL MODIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION
Another item that was concentrated on during the CASTLE simulations was the
effect of a stick and rudder reconfiguration system instead of a stick only reconfiguration
system. The 1750A research processor only contains 32 kilobytes of usable random
access memory (RAM) for use by the RCLAWS module, the Slim Control Laws, and the
Failure Simulation, see Figure 15. Multiple test scenarios were conducted to investigate
the implication of conducting the test with and without inclusion of the rudder into the
reconfirmation algorithm. Test results showed that although the inclusion of the rudder
pedal made vast improvements during some test cases, it was less important in others.
The cases where rudder pedal inputs were helpful were predominately outside the Class
B envelope (high dynamic pressure). For test points within the Class B envelope, only
small directional deviations were observed. Therefore, for flight test, which is required to
be executed within the Class B envelope, the rudder pedal could be excluded from the
retrofit reconfiguration implementation without adversely affecting the data quality
significantly.
In an attempt to control the small uncommanded yaw motion, an optional “rudder
pedal modification” was designed. The rudder pedal modification was implemented as a
simple fixed gain proportional integral control law with a zero model reference. This is
possible because during the majority of the F/A-18C flight envelope, rudder pedals are
not used for maneuvering. While the pilot is not technically prevented from making
pedal inputs with the retrofit rudder pedal modification command option enabled, the
system will attempt to cancel any yaw motion caused by the pilot's input. The
consequence is that the yaw response will appear sluggish or unresponsive to pedal
inputs. The capability to insert pedal commands can be enabled or disabled by selecting
the appropriate FSFCC table and row numbers (Table B-3).
HARDWARE IN THE LOOP RESULTS
The HILS test results were used to optimize the FSFCC implementation of the
RCLAWS. In particular, HILS testing was used to: define the envelope limits for
automatic reversion from the research to the production (701E) control laws, finalize the
flight test instrumentation message data and display layout for ground monitoring, and
tune the cost functions and gain schedules for the reconfigurable controller. Flight
conditions and HQR tolerances (Table B-5) were defined by the pilots and engineers
based on HILS experience. In addition, liberal use of the simulator helped to streamline
the flight test program by identifying candidate maneuvers early in the program that were
not interesting from the point of view of reconfiguration. Original candidate flight test
maneuvers included heading captures and simulated single engine wave offs, but these
maneuvers were eventually dropped because the handling qualities did not change
significantly regardless of the failure scenario or whether the retrofit reconfigurable
controller was active. Lastly, the HILS simulator sessions increased test efficiency by
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Figure 13: Software Simulation Results, Production CAS, Pilot B, All Maneuvers

Figure 14: Software Simulation Results, Retrofit Control, Pilot B, All Maneuvers
Source: Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and
Flight Testing of Adaptive Flight Control Systems for Existing Aircraft,” Draft Report,
March 2006.
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Figure 15: 1750A Research Processor Memory Available for RCLAWS
Source: Meloney, D. and Doyle, M., “Test Plan for F/A-18 Retrofit Reconfigurable
Control System Flight Test,” SA-05-04-3266C, April 2005.
allowing the aircrew and ground crew to practice the maneuver set up, the maneuver
execution, and develop a logical flow for test points. The author believes the extensive
use of the HILS was extremely important in a research project with limited funding and
should be incorporated into future test projects.
During the MFS sessions, three aircrew from Air Test and Evaluation Squadron
(VX) 23 (one Navy (the author), and two Marine fleet F/A-18 pilots), performed the
evaluation. During the evaluation, it was noted that a standard aggressive pitch capture
tended to produce undesirable handling qualities. Post-flight analysis determined that the
stick input rate was so aggressive that the slow update rate of the aircraft dynamics model
(5 Hz) was inadequate for the standard maneuver. It was determined that future HILS
and flight test would incorporate a less aggressive pitch capture. This was noted as
compensation, however, it was also noted that a reduced maneuver would have likely not
been required in a fully capable, production retrofit system without insufficient dynamic
model update rates. Qualitative results from the HILS sessions were remarkably similar
to previous piloted simulations. The results from all three aircrew average one to two
HQRs better for the RCLAWS engaged test points. A compilation of the test maneuvers
and HQRs assigned by pilot C is shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17 for production CAS
and RCLAWS, respectively.
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Figure 16: HILS Test Results for Production CAS, Pilot C, All Maneuvers

Figure 17: HILS Test Results for Retrofit Control, Pilot C, All Maneuvers
Source: Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and
Flight Testing of Adaptive Flight Control Systems for Existing Aircraft,” Draft Report,
March 2006.
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Chapter 6: Flight Test Planning
OVERVIEW
The primary objective of this testing was to gather flight test data, both
quantitative and qualitative, to validate simulation results and support the further
development of the RCLAWS. The secondary objective of this testing was to evaluate
the effectiveness of the RCLAWS to control the aircraft with a degraded FCS. Initially,
the operating budget allowed for three flights to perform the in flight evaluation of the
RCLAWS. A fortunate reduction in flight hours costs for the chase aircraft allowed for a
fourth flight.
TEST ENVELOPE
The FSFCC was engaged within the modified NASA-designated Class B
envelope shown in Figure 18 (12,000 feet to 33,000 feet, less than 250 KCAS). If the
limits of the modified Class B envelope were exceeded, the FSFCC 1750A processor
would automatically disengage, as described in chapter 3. By limiting flight to this
envelope, the risk of structural damage to the aircraft was significantly reduced in the
event that an error in the FSFCC software commanded a control surface to full deflection.
In deriving the test envelope, NASA used normal load factor transients as a metric to
define the boundaries in a simulator (Carter and Stephenson, 1999). With the automatic
disengage Nz threshold set at 4g, multiple control surfaces were failed hard-over at a
number of different flight conditions, and the 1750A was expected to disengage the
system prior to the aircraft exceeding the 6g normal acceleration operational limit of the
test aircraft. For any flight condition that exceeded the load-factor transient limit, the
point was considered outside of the Class B envelope. In addition, a specialized Ada
software load for laboratory testing was developed and executed. This special Ada
software load simulated worst-case scenarios, commanding multiple control surfaces to
their limits instantaneously. These scenarios were tested throughout the NASA Class B
envelope and provided additional confirmation that the FSFCCs could be safely flown
within the NASA Class B envelope.
The low dynamic pressures maintained the relatively low aircraft energy state
necessary to ensure minimum structural risk to the aircraft if a major computer
malfunction were to occur. There was no lower limit to dynamic pressure. The lower
altitude limit of the original NASA Class B envelope was 15,000 feet and was chosen to
allow sufficient altitude for recovery from potential out-of-control flight. For this test,
the lower altitude limit was decreased to 12,000 feet to allow reasonable aircraft response
in the Power Approach (PA) configuration while still providing sufficient altitude for
recovery from any unexpected out-of-control flight. The resulting envelope is referred to
as the modified Class B envelope.
Due to limited capacity of the 1750A research processor, the flight dynamics
model to which the RCLAWS compare the actual aircraft response was tuned to two
predefined flight conditions, designated by the gray diamonds in Figure 18. The two
points defined in this software allowed Cruise (CR) Flying Qualities (FQ) to be tested at
20,000 feet / 235 KCAS, and PA FQ to be tested at 16,000 feet / 8.1 degrees AOA.
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Figure 18: Flight Test Envelope
Source: Meloney, D. and Doyle, M., “Test Plan for F/A-18 Retrofit Reconfigurable
Control System Flight Test,” SA-05-04-3266C, April 2005.
FLIGHT CLEARANCE ISSUES
Testing at NAS Patuxent River is generally performed to support fleet
requirements and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) acquisition programs. The
culture and processes in place are tailored to this type of work. As a result, extra planning
and extensive coordination was required for this flight test research program. In addition,
the budget restrictions of a research program created a need for thorough planning to
maximize the efficiency of data gathering.
A major cost driver of flight testing flight control systems can be the verification
and validation of flight critical software. This was one of the primary advantages of using
the FSFCC: the research software can only be engaged in a limited part of the envelope,
and this can greatly reduce the software testing burden. While the retrofit system was
subjected to extensive hardware-in-the-loop testing, module level testing of the research
software was not performed. The primary safety of flight risk mitigation was to conduct
the flight tests at altitude in a low dynamic pressure part of the envelope.
With this envelope restriction as the primary risk-mitigation, it was possible to
coordinate agreement on a flight clearance, written in such a way that the research
software could be substantially modified between flights without requiring a new flight
clearance. In its place, an FSFCC software modification process was developed that
required a greatly reduced approval chain for changes made within certain bounds. This
allowed reduced down time and the associated costs. This was a significant departure
from the normal NAVAIR procedure that would normally require a new clearance for
each new software configuration. It is the author’s experience that this departure was
unprecedented and vital to the success of this program. The extensive coordination and
planning allowed for a project with a very modest budget to conduct efficient flight test.
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The NAVAIR flight clearance process, in this case, was very cooperative with the test
team in allowing them to utilize their expertise to provide a safe test environment. The
author believes this cooperation between the test team and the flight clearance team
should be adopted for future projects to allow for more cost and time efficient test
programs.
Another significant flight clearance issue was the fact that V10.1 is no longer the
current F/A-18A/B/C/D FCC software version. Version 10.5.1 (v10.5.1) contains
substantial improvements, particularly in the areas of redundancy management and high
angle-of-attack performance. While flying with v10.l was still acceptable, it does present
an increased risk over flight with v10.5.1. In order to mitigate the risk, the pertinent
differences between v10.5.1 and v10.1 were briefed before every flight with special
attention to changes in emergency procedures. For example, AOA probes failures during
take-off in v10.1 are not sufficiently incorporated into the failure logic, and presented one
of the greatest risks in reverting to v10.1 software. To mitigate this risk, AOA probes
were double checked prior to flight and monitored for failure during take-off. In
addition, pilots were required to perform at least one takeoff in the simulator with a failed
AOA probe prior to being scheduled for a test flight. A full list of differences between
v10.1 and v10.5.1 is included in appendix C.
TEST CONFIGURATION AND LOADOUT
Flight test was conducted in the loadout defined as: clean configuration with a
single centerline. Therefore, no pylons were loaded on under wing stations (stations 2, 3,
7, and 8), missile well covers were installed on the fuselage stations (stations 4 and 6) and
empty LAU-7s were loaded on the wingtips (stations 1 and 9). The only store loaded was
a 330 gallon external fuel tank on the centerline station (station 6).
Test points were performed in the following configurations: Cruise (CR) defined
as landing gear and flaps up and Powered Approach (PA) defined as landing gear down
and flaps full. Because the slimmed control laws did not include speed brake
compensation, it was recommended that speed brakes remain retracted whenever the
1750A processor was engaged.
METHOD OF TEST
The method of test was identical to the method utilized at the HILS sessions with
the learning points incorporated. Two test maneuvers were removed from the flight
cards: heading capture and SSE. Buildup in FSFCC modes was again followed (e.g.,
baseline prior to RCLAWS, no failure prior to failure).
INSTRUMENTATION AND REAL TIME MONITORING
Data were collected using the onboard instrumentation system, which was a
Digital Data Acquisition System (DDAS). The DDAS is a time division multiplex data
acquisition system featuring programmable format definition and modular remote
multiplexing units. Analog and digital signals were encoded and inserted into an
unencrypted Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) data stream for onboard recording and
telemetry down link.
The PCM data stream included embedded Inter-Range
Instrumentation Group (IRIG-B) time code for data synchronization with aircraft and
cockpit voice recording system (CVRS) data.
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The PCM data stream and analog pilot’s voice were transmitted to the ground
station via the aircraft telemetry system. The telemetry transmitter provided 10 watts of
output power and had a frequency range between 1435.5 and 1535.5 MHz. The
transmitter frequency was selectable from the cockpit.
REAL TIME DATA REQUIREMENTS
Selected parameters were monitored real time to ensure test mission safety, as
well as to verify satisfactory test point completion. The Real-Time Telemetry Processing
Station (RTPS) ground station was used for in-flight telemetry monitoring. The basic
RTPS project engineer station is comprised of ten strip chart recorders (8 channels/chart),
two digital displays (16 parameters/display), seven color monitors, one user-interactive
station with graphics displays, and various hardcopy units.
The initial required telemetry setup included pilot’s voice, IRIG-B range time,
and safety of test parameters (e.g., Nz, AOA, sideslip, etc). Strip chart data were used to
select areas for post-flight data reduction. On board recorded parameters were used for
quantitative data analysis post flight.
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Chapter 7: Flight Test Results
OVERVIEW
Four test flights were made in two aircraft with two pilots at NAS Patuxent River
in 2005 and 2006. Both aircraft were F/A-18C models, had similar instrumentation
systems, and were equivalent for the purposes of this test. The same maneuvers were
flown during the flight testing as were flown in the HILS sessions except for heading
capture and the SSE evaluation. Pitch doublets, pitch attitude captures, bank angle
captures, and target tracking were performed in CR, and pitch doublets, pitch attitude
captures, and bank angle captures were performed in PA. The same FSFCC modes and
failure combinations that were performed in the simulator were also tested in flight. The
first three flights were flown by Pilot D (the author), a United States Navy fleet
experienced F/A-18 test pilot, and the last flight was flown by Pilot E, a United States
Marine Corps fleet experienced F/A-18 test pilot. The test matrix was completed during
the first three flights, and the fourth flight was used to revisit the most revealing test
points with a second pilot for a different perspective. Both pilots had flown similar test
points in the simulator prior to their flights, and both pilots started their first flight with a
comparison of FSFCC modes 1 and 2 (RCLAWS both inactive and active without
failures, respectively).
All four flights proceeded as expected, with the exception of three cases of
unanticipated aircraft response. Of these three cases, the first and third occurred during
test maneuvers, and the second occurred during the second flight when the aircraft was
configured in PA with RCLAWS engaged.
UNANTICIPATED AIRCRAFT RESPONSE
During the first flight, uncommanded yaw oscillations were noted during the
vertical portion of a guns tracking maneuver with the right aileron failed at 0 degrees
from trim. The pilot discontinued the tracking task momentarily, but after the oscillation
ceased, was comfortable enough to reacquire the target and continue tracking. In-flight
analysis suspected and post-flight data analysis confirmed that the aircraft temporarily
dropped below the airspeed tolerance, and this had caused higher-than-anticipated flight
control gains. As described in chapter 6, the RCLAWS module was optimized about
only two points in the modified Class B envelope. The solution for the remaining flights
was to remain within the tolerances, and to have the test conductor make reminder
airspeed calls to the aircrew as necessary during the guns tracking maneuver.
In the PA configuration during the second flight, the test team noted a high
frequency, small amplitude oscillation in the retrofit increment to the lateral stick
command. The magnitude of the oscillation was small enough that the pilot perceived no
lateral motion. That flight was executed with FSFCC version 3.1.7 software, which
allowed the pilot to select from nominal, 75%, or 125% reconfigurable control gains for
all axes in flight. Nominal gains were used for the entirety of the first and second flights.
After the second flight, however, the FSFCC software was modified to version 3.2.7,
which used the nominal pitch gains, but enabled the pilot to select diminished
reconfigurable control gains for the roll axis (60% of nominal).
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During the fourth flight, a small amplitude, low frequency roll oscillation was
noted during smooth pitch attitude captures for the 0 degree aileron failure with the
retrofit system engaged at the PA flight condition. The point was re-tested after having
the pilot select a reduced roll gain (60% of nominal). The oscillation was lessened, but
not eliminated. Post-flight data analysis revealed that these roll oscillations were likely
due to the simplified gain schedules employed.
OVERALL HANDLING QUALITIES RESULTS
Table 2 and Table 3 give flight test HQRs for pilots D in CR and PA
configurations, respectively. Table 4 gives the flight test HQRs for Pilot E. In these
tables, commas separate ratings from different executions of the same test point, and
ratings enclosed in brackets were flown with the optional rudder pedal modification off.
Table B-5 describes the maneuvers and tolerances used to define desired and adequate
performance for HQRs, and Figure A-1 is the standard Cooper-Harper Handling Qualities
Rating scale used for HQRs given in this program. Figure 19 and Figure 20 are graphical
depictions of the combined pilot D and pilot E HQRs for production CAS and RCLAWS,
respectively.
As mentioned earlier, there were two maneuvers that involved unanticipated
aircraft motion. These maneuvers resulted in worse HQRs with the RCLAWS engaged
than with the RCLAWS disengaged. Additionally, there are three other cases for which
the HQR is worse with the RCLAWS engaged. The first case occurred during the
vertical portion of the fine target tracking maneuver with the 6 degree stabilator failure at
the CR flight condition, the pilot noted some undesired yaw response. The second case
occurred during the 0 degree right aileron failure in the PA configuration, the pilot noted
a hesitation as the aircraft rolled through wings level during the aggressive bank-to-bank
roll. Post-flight data analysis indicated that both problems were due to the lack of
integrated yaw control in the retrofit design. In particular the hesitation through wings
level for the PA point was linked to an interaction of the RCLAWS with the optional
rudder pedal modification. Though the same problem was not noted on the next test
point, a 0 degree failure of the right stabilator, the test team decided not to use the rudder
pedal modification for the remainder of the test program. A production reconfigurable
control system would be designed for full reconfiguration in all three axes, and would
therefore not suffer this same interaction problem.
The final case with a worse HQR for the RCLAWS engaged was the aggressive
pitch capture for the 30 degree aileron failure in CR for Pilot E. Even though a worse
HQR (HQR 4 versus HQR 3) was given for the RCLAWS-engaged case, pilot comments
during the test maneuvers indicated that the handling qualities were better with the
retrofit system. Immediately after finishing the integrated test set, the pilot was asked for
his overall impression. He stated that the aircraft was much more controllable with the
retrofit system. He went on to state he “would consider the overall handling qualities of
the aircraft with the 30 degree aileron failure and the RCLAWS active to be HQR 3 to 4
whereas the handling qualities for the same failure without the RCLAWS would be HQR
5 to 6.” (Kelly, 2006)
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Table 2: CR Flight Test HQRs for Pilot D
Flight 1
Flight 1
Flight 1
Flight 1
CR Flight Condition
No Failures
Aileron = 0 deg
Aileron = +15 deg
Stab = 0 deg
Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit
Pitch Capture
Smooth
2
2
2
2
5
4
4
3
Aggressive
2
2
2
2
5
4
4
3
Bank to Bank
Smooth
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
Aggressive
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
3
Target Tracking Level
Coarse
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
Turns
Fine
2
2
3
2
3
3
3
3
Target Tracking
Coarse
2
2
3
5
5
4
4
3
Maneuvering
Fine
2
2
3
DND
5
4
4
3
Flight 2
Flight 2
Flight 3
No Failures
Aileron = 0 deg
Aileron = +15 deg
Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit Baseline Retrofit
Pitch Capture
Smooth
5
3
3
3
3
[3]
Aggressive
6
3
3
3
5
[3]
Bank to Bank
Smooth
4
3
3
3
3
[3]
Aggressive
4
3
3
3
3
[3]
Target Tracking Level
Coarse
5
4, [3]
3
3
3
[3]
Turns
Fine
5
4, [3]
3
3
3
[3]
Target Tracking
Coarse
5
5, [4]
3
3
3
[3]
Maneuvering
Fine
5
5, [4]
3
3
3
[4]
CR Flight Condition
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Table 3: PA Flight Test HQR’s for Pilot D
PA Flight Condition
Pitch Capture
Bank to Bank

Smooth
Aggressive
Smooth
Aggressive

CR Flight Condition
Pitch Capture
Bank to Bank

Smooth
Aggressive
Smooth
Aggressive

Flight 2 & 3
No Failures
Baseline Retrofit
2, 3
2
2, 3
2
2, 3
2
2, 3
2

Flight 2
Aileron = 0 deg
Baseline Retrofit
3
2
3
3
4
4
4
5

Flight 3
Aileron = -15 deg
Baseline Retrofit
3
[3]
3
[3]
3
[3]
3
[3]

Flight 2
Stab = 0 deg
Baseline Retrofit
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Flight 3
Stab = -3 deg
Baseline Retrofit
3
[3]
5
[3]
4
[3]
4
[3]

Flight 3
Stab = -6 deg
Baseline Retrofit
4
[3]
4
[3]
3
[3]
3
[3]
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Flight 3
Aileron -30 deg
Baseline Retrofit
3
[3]
3
[3]
3
[3]
3
[3]

Table 4: Flight Test HQRs for Pilot E
CR Flight Condition
Pitch
Capture
Bank to
Bank
Target
Tracking
Level Turns
Target
Tracking
Maneuvering

Smooth
Aggressive
Smooth
Aggressive
Coarse
Fine
Coarse
Fine

PA Flight Condition
Pitch
Capture
Bank to
Bank

Smooth
Aggressive
Smooth
Aggressive

Flight 4
No Failures
Baseline Retrofit
2
3
2
3
2
2
2
2

-

Flight 4
No Failures
Baseline Retrofit
2
2
2
2
-
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Flight 4
Aileron = +30 deg
Baseline Retrofit
2
[2]
3
[4]
4
[3]
4
[3]
4
[4]
4
[4]
5
5

[4]
[4]

Flight 4
Aileron = 0 deg
Baseline Retrofit
3
[4]
4
[4]
4
5
-

Flight 4
Stab = -6 deg
Baseline Retrofit
2
[3]
3
[3]
4
[3]
5
[3]

Figure 19: Flight Test Results for Baseline Control, Pilots D & E, All Maneuvers

Figure 20: Flight Test Results for Retrofit Control, Pilots D & E, All Maneuvers
Source: Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and
Flight Testing of Adaptive Flight Control Systems for Existing Aircraft,” Draft Report,
March 2006.
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Twelve individual comparisons of the RCLAWS to the baseline (non-retrofit)
system were made for the no failure case. In each of these comparisons, the pilot noted
no difference in the aircraft response. This is verified by the identical HQRs and gives
evidence that the retrofit system does not affect the baseline response if the vehicle is
behaving nominally (i.e., not interfering).
The performance with the RCLAWS engaged is better than the baseline system
for 35 out of the 85 individual comparisons with a simulated surface failure. The
baseline system is rated better than the RCLAWS in only 5 cases with a simulated failure.
All but one of these cases is attributed to compromises in the retrofit design due to
limitations in the flight hardware. For the final case, pilot comments indicated that,
despite receiving a worse rating, the RCLAWS-engaged performance was preferred.
Of the 45 failure cases for which the RCLAWS and baseline system were given
equal ratings, only four of them were worse than HQR 3 (all HQR 4). This is partly due
to the fact that only small magnitude failures were tested as part of the build up approach
and partly due to the robustness of the F/A-18C platform and the baseline control laws.
Therefore, there was little room for the RCLAWS to improve upon the performance of
the baseline system for many of the failure scenarios tested within the limited scope of
the flight test plan and test envelope.
Even with the F/A-18’s robust design, the HQRs averaged 0.5 points better with
the RCLAWS engaged during a failure than they did without. The mean HQR for
RCLAWS-engaged failure points is approximately 3 with a standard deviation of 0.6, and
the mean HQR for all RCLAWS-disengaged failure points is approximately 3.5 with a
standard deviation of 0.9. While the mean values may appear to be very close, an
examination of the data reveals a definite improvement in performance with the retrofit
system. This improvement is evidenced by the fact that, with simulated failures active,
there are twice as many HQR 2 test points for the retrofit system as for the baseline
system (12 test points versus 6 test points) and significantly fewer HQR 5 ratings for the
retrofit system versus the non-retrofit system (2 test points versus 15 test points).
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
Not only did the HQRs show an improvement with the RCLAWS active, the
quantitative data showed a significant reduction in the coupling as a result of control stick
input. Figure 21 shows the flight test data from a +15 degree right aileron failure in the
CR configuration without RCLAWS active. Figure 22 shows the data from the same
failure configuration with RCLAWS active.
The data presented show a pitch doublet performed multiple times in succession.
In Figure 21 without RCLAWS, there is significant roll coupling to a roughly pure pitch
doublet (denoted with arrows). Conversely with RCLAWS active, in Figure 22, the roll
coupling is significant reduced. In this example, the coupling was approximately 3 times
less with RCLAWS active than production CAS alone. This reduction was also evident
in the relative HQRs assigned by the pilot. The CAS alone event received an HQR of 5,
while the RCLAWS event received an HQR of 4, again a 1 point improvement with the
reconfigurable flight controls.
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Figure 21: Production CAS, +15 degree aileron failure, Pitch Doublets

Figure 22: RCLAWS, +15 degree aileron failure, Pitch Doublets
Source: Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and
Flight Testing of Adaptive Flight Control Systems for Existing Aircraft,” Draft Report,
March 2006.
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ADDITIONAL RCLAWS CONTRIBUTION TO THE F/A-18C
Pilot feedback indicates that for a platform as robust as the F/A-18C, the greatest
advantage of the RCLAWS is realized at the onset of the failure. While a modest
improvement in handling qualities was seen during post-failure maneuvering, the author
believes the greatest benefit is the system’s ability to immediately recognize a departure
of aircraft motion from that commanded, and to apply control inputs to compensate.
Without RCLAWS engaged, the pilot was sometimes surprised by the magnitude of the
motion resulting from an inserted failure, even though the failure was expected. The pilot
often spent a significant amount of time reacquiring straight and level flight and trimming
the aircraft to zero rates (if zero rates were within the trim capability of the failed
system). With RCLAWS engaged, however, failure insertion was often transparent to the
pilot, and any change in aircraft dynamics was only noticed upon maneuvering. The
almost indistinguishable insertion of the failures will be very beneficial in the real world
application, chapter 8.
This was also noticed in the simulator during the single engine exercises.
Although the rudder pedal contributions were due to the rudder pedal modification vice
reconfigurable control, there was no appreciable directional or lateral component to
corrections for power additions with RCLAWS active vice a significant requirement
without RCLAWS. This would be even more dramatic of a difference in a non-centerline
mounted multiengine aircraft such as the C-17 with a fully capable retrofit algorithm.
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Chapter 8: F/A-18C Real World Fleet Applications
OVERVIEW
In the past two years, there have been three United States Navy Class A mishaps
involving out of control flight associated with flight control effector failures in the F/A18. The United States Navy defines a Class A mishap as any mishap that causes more
than $1 million damage or causes the loss of life. In two of the three incidents the F/A-18
was destroyed at a cost of over $30 million to the government. In the remaining mishap,
the F/A-18 was destroyed and a United States Navy pilot also lost his life. All three of
these incidents have been partially caused by the mechanical failure of the inboard
leading edge flap. In the first two incidents, the pilot lost control at the onset of the
failure and it was never fully regained. In the most recent incident, the pilot did not loose
control until the aircraft slowed for transition to a landing configuration. Based upon the
circumstances of the third incident and the simulations conducted since the incident, this
author contends that the aircraft involved in the mishaps remained flyable, not
withstanding the major flight control effector failure. Nevertheless, the mishaps were
virtually unavoidable because the pilot could not always learn to control the new aircraft
in the short time available prior to loss of control.
LEF FAILURE BACKGROUND
As denoted in the aircraft description in chapter 3, the LEFs are full span in the
F/A-18C. The LEFs are separated, however, into two parts at the wing fold joint. These
parts are commonly referred to as the inboard LEF and the outboard LEF. Although the
inboard and outboard sections of the LEF appear as though they are not physically tied to
one another, they are mechanized to operate as a pair and schedule in unison.
Over the 28 year history of the F/A-18 flying in the United States Navy inventory,
there have been 14 documented cases of LEF failures. Four of these cases have involved
inboard LEF failures (all of which led to a mishap) and the remaining 10 cases have
involved outboard LEF failures (all of which landed successfully). Outboard LEF
failures are considerably more benign than the inboard LEF failures due in part to their
respective sizes and location relative to the remainder of the wing surface. The inboard
LEF is approximately twice as large as the outboard LEF. Engineers suspect that the
outboard LEF failure has been caused by an asymmetry control unit failure that allows
the outboard LEF to reach its structural limit of 55 degrees LEU. Flight characteristics of
the failure show that a moderate roll off into the direction of the failure can be easily
countered with lateral stick and trim. In several cases, the outboard LEF has even
departed the aircraft due to air loads, resulting in no significant adverse handling
qualities.
The first inboard LEF failure occurred during developmental testing of the F/A-18
at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland in 1982. Fortunately, the pilot survived and was
therefore able to describe not only the failure, but also the aircraft’s reduced flying
qualities. Engineers determined that the failure was caused by a failed hydraulic drive
unit (HDU) spline. As a result of this failure, engineers changed the LEF drive
mechanization (HDU spline) to incorporate a brake mechanism that froze the LEF at
approximately 4 degrees LEU. This device, referred to as the torque limiter, successfully
prevented additional inboard LEF failures for 22 years in United States Navy F/A-18C
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aircraft. In 2002, however, an F/A-18C flying under normal operating conditions
experienced an inboard LEF failure that resulted in the loss of the aircraft. Similarly,
twice in early 2006, two F/A-18 aircraft and one pilot were lost due to a failed inboard
LEF. An engineering investigation is currently underway to determine the root cause of
these mishaps. Regardless of the exact cause of the failure, the air loads will drive the
failed control surface to approximately 55 degrees LEU which results in adverse handling
qualities and the possibility of out of control fight.
INBOARD LEF FAILURE AND OUT OF CONTROL FLIGHT
In the 2004 and first 2006 mishaps, the aircraft initially departed controlled flight
with an abrupt roll in the direction of the failure. The pilot momentarily regained control,
but then lost it again with a highly coupled departure and never regained controlled flight.
The most recent mishap, however, the aircrew recovered the plane to an upright attitude
and flew almost 100 miles prior to departing controlled flight. The most recent mishap
demonstrated that, although the aircraft was in a failure state, the highly redundant flight
control system allowed the aircraft to transit a considerable distance. In the end,
however, the aircraft and pilot succumbed to new dynamics and departed controlled
flight.
An investigation began to determine why the aircraft was controllable in some
conditions and was uncontrollable in others. A group of aircrew from VX-23 at NAS
Patuxent River, Maryland and several flying qualities and flight controls engineers sought
to recreate the scenario in the MFS facility in order to develop a technique that allowed
aircrew to either fly and land the plane, or that at least allowed them additional time to
reach a location more conducive to rescue. Replicating the failed surface in the MFS was
not as easy a task as first thought. The aerodynamic models used to simulate the flying
qualities of the aircraft were not thought to exist for such a dramatic failure. Developing
those models would have been time intensive and very difficult. Fortunately, NASA
possessed the required aerodynamic models and allowed the United States Navy to use
them in the analysis. NASA developed these aerodynamic failure models for use with
their Active Aeroelastic Wing (AAW) program flown on the F/A-18. With these flying
qualities models in place in the high fidelity simulators at MFS, the engineers and aircrew
were able to recreate the scenarios and determine a possible reason for the immediate loss
of control in two cases, yet the ability to continue flight for a period of time in the third
case.
During the MFS sessions, the team observed that the aircraft was flying at greater
than 300 KCAS when the LEF failed in all three cases. Upon failure, the aircraft began a
rapid roll into the direction of the failed surface. The roll rate was controllable with
lateral control inputs. In all three of the recent cases, the aircraft was able to return to
upright, mostly straight and level flight. In two of the three cases, however, the aircraft
began to slow down. At approximately 275 to 300 KCAS, the aircraft departed
controlled flight and the pilot was unable to regain control. The simulation at MFS
showed these exact traits. Upon further investigation and diagnosis of the flight control
position relative to the control stick position, the team observed that the aircrew needed a
cross controlled input to maintain a wings level attitude and a constant heading when the
aircraft slowed below 300 KCAS. The team concluded that lateral stick was required
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opposite the failed wing flap to oppose roll off, and that a rudder input in the direction of
the failure was required to prevent a constant skidded turn opposite the failure.
Most F/A-18 pilots would agree that the Hornet has a superior ability to maneuver
in all portions of the envelope. This maneuverability is due in large part to the extremely
complex flight control system that determines the correct flight control position for a
commanded stick and rudder input. The flight controls surfaces are very autonomous in
the F/A-18. For example, both the LEF and TEF schedule automatically with changing
airspeed and AOA. In addition, a rolling surface to rudder interconnect (RSRI) provides
for turn coordination automatically. In the case of a failed LEF, however, the otherwise
extremely helpful flight control system contributed to the departures. As mentioned
above, the aircrew had to command a cross controlled input to maintain straight and level
flight. If the RSRI is functioning, the FCCs interpret any lateral stick input as a
commanded turn. The commanded lateral stick automatically commanded rudder
deflection into the direction of turn for coordination. This commanded lateral stick
adversely affected the flying qualities in two ways. First, without actually being in a turn,
that needs rudder for coordination, the commanded rudder is suspected to increase
sideslip away from the failure, contributing to the flat turn that builds as airspeed
decreases. Second, the RSRI commanded rudder reduced the amount of rudder
deflection available to the aircrew to prevent sideslip buildup.
The auto scheduling flaps compound the problem of the RSRI. As one can
imagine, if a large obstruction is placed on the leading edge of a wing, it no longer
efficiently creates lift. The obstruction, however, would create a large amount of
parasitic drag. This rapid reduction of lift and increase in parasitic drag on the failed side
has been identified as the possible cause for the rapid roll into the direction of the failure.
As the airspeed decreases on a standard wing, the coefficient of lift is typically
decreasing along with the induced drag. However, in the case of the F/A-18C wing, the
flaps are scheduling to maintain the lift with slowing airspeed. This results in an
increasing coefficient of lift and corresponding induced drag on the non-failure side.
Conversely, on the failed side, as airspeed decreases, even though there is a large, nonaerodynamic surface impeding airflow, the parasitic drag decreases. As airspeed
continues to drop and the functional LEF is scheduled as commanded (as described in
chapter 2, the TEFs are frozen with a LEF failure in CR), the induced drag eventually
overcomes both the parasitic drag on the failed wing and the rudder authority of the pilot
which has been reduced due to the RSRI. The author has concluded that this combination
results in a classic adverse yaw departure and aircraft control was lost. In two of the
three cases, after control is lost, the outstanding flight control system and departure
recovery logic resident in the F/A-18 allowed the aircrew to briefly regain control of the
aircraft in a nose low attitude. Once the pilot attempted recovery, however, AOA
increased and the flaps again began to auto-schedule, which lead to a re-departure similar
to the first.
The solution devised through extensive simulation was to disable all of the
“helpful” modes of the F/A-18. The team realized that there was sufficient control power
to offset the parasitic drag induced by the failed LEF, as long as the aircraft stayed above
approximately 300 KCAS. The new procedure dictated that the pilot maintain 300
KCAS or more (not to exceed 350 KCAS) until the aircraft was switched to a back-up
mode, which removed flap scheduling and reduced the gains associated with the RSRI.
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This back-up mode is referred to as “gain override.” This mode tells the FCCs to
configure the aircraft for set, known conditions regardless the aircraft’s actual conditions.
For example, if gain override is selected with the flaps up, the jet configures the aircraft
for flight at 35,000 feet, 0.7 Mach number and 2 degrees AOA. In simulation, gain
override mode allowed the pilot to reconfigure the aircraft to permit a safe landing. The
author and numerous other F/A-18 test pilots attempted flights without performing the
gain override procedures without success. In each attempt with gain override, however,
although the workload was considerable both at onset and throughout the remainder of
the flight, a safe controllable landing was made. As a result of the simulation testing, the
gain override procedures were incorporated in the emergency procedures for a LEF
failure and distributed to the F/A-18 community to prevent future loss of life.
INBOARD LEF FAILURE AND RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL
SIMULATION PLANNING
The RCLAWS program had already begun testing when the two most recent
F/A-18 LEF mishaps occurred. Many questions were raised regarding how the
capabilities of the RCLAWS architecture would handle the LEF failures. Unfortunately,
such a determination was outside the scope of the RCALWS test plan. In light of this
limitation, the author set out to determine the effectiveness of the RCLAWS in-line
method of reconfiguration and whether or not it would prevent the loss of aircraft and
aircrew after the completion of the RCLAWS test program. Once the MFS sessions
determined the cause of the departures, several engineers concluded that the RCLAWS
in-line method would not be able to maintain aircraft control. Many thought, the
utilization of the gain override modes of the FCCs would prevent RCLAWS from
maintaining control. Nevertheless, the author still endeavored to demonstrate the
system’s response in the simulated environment.
The MFS facility would have been the ideal environment to demonstrate the
capabilities of the RCLAWS against this failure with HILS. Unfortunately, two
circumstances prevented use of the MFS facility for the HILS. First, was the requirement
for the failure mode had to be resident in the failure module of the RCLAWS architecture
as written in the FSFCCs. Adding this failure to logic already resident in the software
would have required extensive software modifications and was outside the scope of this
thesis. Second and more importantly, as previously discussed, the RCLAWS, as
implemented on the FSFCCs, are optimized around two airspeeds only (235 KCAS in CR
and 8.1 AOA in PA) due to the limited computation space in the 1750A processor.
Adequate determination of the feasibility of the RCLAWS to maintain control over the
envelope from failure insertion at a tactical airspeed to a simulated landing was outside
the capability of the FSFCCs. In addition, as implemented in the FSFCCs, the 701E will
not allow the 1750A to arm if gain override has been selected. These factors therefore
prevented use of the MFS facility to determine RCLAWS effectiveness against a LEF
failure.
Software simulation, however, could provide a means to test RCLAWS response
to the catastrophic LEF failure. During the early CASTLE simulations, the test team
investigated a LEF failure for a hard over failure in both directions (LEU and LED).
However, the LEU failure was limited to 4 degrees LEU, since engineering analysis
believed that 4 degrees LEU was the failure mode of that control surface. During these
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tests, the RCLAWS provided improved or unchanged handling qualities throughout the
envelope as shown in Figure A-4 and Figure A-5. Once again, the problem of
programming the CASTLE simulator to simulate the desired failure was not without
difficulty. The NASA derived aerodynamic models were coded in a different version of
CASTLE. Once the software engineers had completed the transformation, the failure was
loaded into the CASTLE simulator.
Despite the obvious disadvantage of not being able to perform the simulation at
the MFS facility due to FSFCC restrictions, there were several advantages to performing
this test in the CASTLE simulator. First, the CASTLE simulations enabled the test team
to observe the effect of RCLAWS in a larger operational environment, instead of seeing
the effect at only one or two predefined points. In addition, the CASTLE simulator is not
resource limited like the 1750A processor on the FSFCCs, and it can incorporate rudder
commands into the reconfiguration algorithm. This incorporation allows for a more
powerful reconfiguration system. As discussed in chapter 4, there is also the added
advantage of incorporating beta feedback into the dynamics module to provide a better
reconfiguration response from RCLAWS. Lastly, the CASTLE simulation allows use of
reconfigurable flight control with or without gain override selected.
Although there were numerous advantages to the CASTLE simulation, the limited
budget for this testing required that tradeoff in the implementation of the RCLAWS
algorithm. As set forth in chapter 4, the engineers optimized the CASTLE simulator
around seven flight conditions during the simulation test planning. The two flight
conditions most similar to the failure flight profile to a landing were the 20,000 feet, 0.7
Mach and the 20,000 feet, 0.3 Mach number. Although it would have been ideal to
utilize a larger envelope, budget constraints required performance of the evaluation
between these predefined points. Fortunately, the simulator logic utilizes a linear
algorithm that allowed a smooth transition to the closest predefined test condition.
Therefore, while performing the deceleration from approximately 325 KCAS to a landing
speed of approximately 190 KCAS, the RCLAWS used a combination of the two known
conditions to interpolate the correct dynamic response. Although this interpolation
limited the accuracy of the results, the author contends that these particular test cases and
the associated results were comparable to the outcome with a perfect dynamic model of
the entire envelope. Finally, unlike the previous flight and HILS results, that this
simulation utilized FCS OFP Version 10.5.1 (v10.5.1) instead of v10.1 utilized in the
FSFCCs.
INBOARD LEF FAILURE AND RECONFIGURABLE FLIGHT CONTROL
SIMULATION SESSION
During the simulation events, the author endeavored to prove that reconfigurable
flight control would provide a better aircraft response than the gain override technique to
allow for a transit and landing. The simulation tested four different scenarios. The first
case simulated the baseline v10.5.1 aircraft without the benefit of RCLAWS to confirm
that CASTLE simulation response was similar to both the MFS data and the mishap data.
The second case incorporated an all axis reconfigurable algorithm. This algorithm
utilized not only the rudders, but also integrated beta feedback into the RCLAWS
computations for higher fidelity. The third case utilized the RCLAWS control laws, but
in this case the RSRI, thought to contribute to the departures, was disabled. This case
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attempted to isolate the cause of the departure between the auto scheduling flaps and the
RSRI. The final configuration involved RCLAWS with gain override selected. The
author tested this scenario to determine if RCLAWS required the use of gain override to
perform the required task of transit and a simulated landing. The author also repeated the
final case utilizing trim to increase control authority.
The author tested all four scenarios with a fleet representative loadout and gross
weight. The loadout flown included three drop tanks, two 1,000 pound bombs and four
air to air missiles. The fuel state for these tests was approximately 10,000 pounds. It
should be noted, that during MFS sessions in order to get to a speed in which a safe
landing could be made, all external stores had to be jettisoned and fuel load adjusted to
approximately 3,000 pounds. In order to more accurately demonstrate an average pilot’s
response to the failure and as dictated in the NATOPS manual, the pilot delayed stores
jettison until reaching approximately 245 KCAS and transitioning to a landing
configuration. The author utilized the same stores jettison criteria for the CASTLE
simulations. In all cases, the right LEF was failed to full deflection LEU (approximately
55 degrees) between 325 and 335 KCAS.
During the baseline case, the aircraft responded similarly to both the mishap
events and the MFS sessions with a sharp roll off in the direction of the failure. The
author countered the roll with left lateral stick and regained level flight with
approximately 2 inches of lateral stick (3 inches is maximum lateral stick deflection). As
the aircraft began to slow, the lateral stick increased to full. Slowing below
approximately 280 KCAS, the author slowly applied right rudder to stop an
approximately 2 degree/second yaw rate. With previous failure experience and prior
knowledge of the failure flight characteristics, the author was able to achieve
approximately 260 KCAS prior to reaching an unrecoverable departure. At the point of
departure, the pilot had applied full lateral stick and full rudder. These results were
comparable to the previous MFS sessions and flight mishap data, however, the author
was able to get to a slightly slower airspeed after applying multiple practices with LEF
failures.
For the second case with the benefits of RCLAWS, the author expected a much
lower controllable airspeed prior to departure. At the onset of the failure, the aircraft
rolled right approximately 5 degrees and then returned to level flight with no aircrew
action. The only failure indications to the pilot were the FCS caution and status page
indicating a failed LEF, an aural tone in the headset and the Master Caution. At
approximately 300 KCAS, an ITS was performed with extremely positive results (HQR
4). The only notable deviation from a nominal aircraft during the ITS was a slight yaw
coupling with a pure pitch input. Slowing the aircraft proved to be a much easier task
without having to fight the roll off with almost full lateral stick. RCLAWS commands to
the FCCs were comparable to the first case. As the aircraft slowed, a slight left yaw rate
developed that was easily countered with slight opposite pedal (approximately 20
pounds). From 250 KCAS to 235 KCAS, the retrofit input to the FCCs was commanding
within 1/2 inch of full lateral stick. After slowing to approximately 235 KCAS (below
normal jettison airspeed), however, the aircraft departed flight and was unrecoverable.
Although the aircraft departed, it was able to attain a slower speed with a considerably
reduced workload. Post departure, the RCLAWS continued to supplement the pilot
commands even though the author had released the controls in accordance with published
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procedures and desired to allow the FCCs to utilize the outstanding departure recovery
logic to recover the aircraft. This simulation case demonstrated the benefits of in-line
reconfiguration in the case of an inboard LEF failure, but also demonstrated a case where
the RCLAWS was not non-interfering with the desired aircraft response.
The third case proved to be the most informative for purposes of comparison to
the MFS sessions. This third simulation also utilized RCLAWS, however the RSRI was
disabled to isolate the LEF scheduling. Again the failure was inserted at approximately
325 KCAS and a slight roll off occurred that corrected itself to level flight with no pilot
input. As the aircraft began to slow, a slight (2 degree/second) right yaw rate developed.
At approximately 300 KCAS the aircraft departed to the right or into the failure. As the
pitch attitude increased nose low and airspeed increased above approximately 320 KCAS,
however, the pilot regained aircraft control. A second attempt to slow the aircraft again
resulted in a departure. Analysis of the RCLAWS input indicated that the RCLAWS
were commanding full lateral stick at the departure with no corresponding rudder input.
It is interesting to note, however, that the departure was so abrupt and unexpected that the
aircrew could not counter it with full the application of rudder. This case demonstrated
that no single factor was the cause of the departures. From the MFS sessions, the
consensus was that the departures were partially caused by the RSRI reducing the rudder
authority available to oppose sideslip. This simulation showed, however, that without
RSRI, the pilots could not slow the aircraft below approximately 300 KCAS. Therefore,
it is the author’s conclusion that although the RSRI may be a contributing factor to the
eventual departure of the aircraft below approximately 250 KCAS, without RSRI, the
aircraft is uncontrollable below 300 KCAS. In addition to the frozen flap scheduling
commands provided by the gain override mode, the largest contribution to the increased
controllability with gain override selected is the reduced, but not eliminated, gains of the
RSRI system.
The final case simulated the RCLAWS engaged with gain override selected. As
described earlier, this mode freezes the flap scheduling and reduces the RSRI control
gains. Again, at the onset of the failure, the aircraft rolled slightly but then corrected
without pilot interaction. During the deceleration from 325 KCAS, the pilot performed
ITSs approximately every 10 KCAS. Again, a slight directional coupling was detected
with pitch inputs. In addition, the author also noted the roll rate to the left was slightly
less than the roll rate to the right during the bank to bank rolls. Analysis showed that
during the left rolls, the pilot inputs together with the RCLAWS contributions
commanded the stick full deflection to the left. This full stick deflection caused the lower
roll rates when in a left roll. Nevertheless, the reduced roll rates were adequate to transit
and land. Slowing the aircraft to 250 KCAS required no action from the pilot except
throttle modulation. Below 250 KCAS, a slight left yaw rate developed that was easily
countered with a small application of rudder pedal (approximately 20 pounds). In the
end, the pilot slowed the aircraft to approximately 13 degrees AOA (215 KCAS) in the
landing configuration, without having to jettison the external stores. Although 215
KCAS is still above an approved landing speed, this performance demonstrated the
capabilities of the RCLAWS module in combination with gain override.
After noting the reduced roll rate during the fourth simulation run and recalling
that the failure condition could be countered with trim during MFS sessions, the author
sought to investigate the effects of trimming out the failure. As described in chapter 3,
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the RCLAWS modify the pilot inputs to achieve the desired response. The FCCs,
however, have the added capability to effectively deflect flight controls through the use
of the lateral trim. After inserting the failure, the pilot trimmed left lateral stick so that
the RCLAWS module was producing zero command. The pilot repeated the same ITSs
at 300 KCAS. This time, the roll rate was approximately equal in both directions. Again,
the pilot was able to slow the aircraft to 215 KCAS with stores loaded with no adverse
qualities.
INBOARD LEF FAILURES WITH RCLAWS RESULTS
The goal of the simulation testing was to provide the pilot with a better aircraft
response to the failure than the current gain override method. The second simulation
demonstrated that the RCLAWS alone effectively allowed the aircrew to slow the aircraft
to approximately 235 KCAS, airspeed well within the jettison envelope of these stores
that conforms with standard controllability check practices. In addition, RCLAWS
allowed the aircrew to slow the aircraft by an additional 10 KCAS in comparison to the
non-retrofit approach. A stores jettison at approximately 250 KCAS and a subsequent
simulated landing established that this configuration was indeed a successful
implementation of the RCLAWS to prevent the loss of aircraft and life.
Although the simulation was successful, from approximately 250 KCAS down to
235 KCAS, the RCLAWS module was commanding within approximately 1/2 inch of
full lateral deflection.
This deflection left the aircrew not only with little
maneuverability, but also on the verge of an uncontrollable departure. Once the pilot
jettisoned the stores and adjusted the gross weight, the RCLAWS flew an approach
similar to a trimmed out non-retrofit approach.
Although the second simulation demonstrated the effectiveness of RCLAWS to
allow the pilot to achieve a typical jettison envelope without the use of gain override, the
author learned two additional lessons from this simulation. The first lesson reinforced
earlier testing results. The author contends that the greatest benefit of RCLAWS occurs
at the onset of the failure. Instead of the aircraft violently departing with a snap roll in
the direction of the failure, the aircraft rolled slightly into the failed wing yet returned to
level flight within 10 seconds with no aircrew input. This aircraft response to failures
could significantly benefit the aircrew for several reasons. When an aircraft emergency
appears, especially when compounded by an unanticipated aircraft response, the pilot’s
typical first reaction is to retard the throttles and assess the situation. Unfortunately, in
the case of the “smart” flight controls on the F/A-18, slowing the aircraft led to a larger
problem due to the auto scheduling flaps and RSRI. With RCLAWS, the aircraft does
not depart with the onset of the LEF failure which allows the aircrew to calmly assess the
situation and determine the proper course of action.
Closely related to the almost transparent failure insertion, is the reduction in trim
requirements with the RCLAWS. This again allows the aircrew to concentrate on
diagnosing the situation and developing a plan. In addition, for some aircrew that
typically pilot fly by wire aircraft, trimming the aircraft is almost foreign. It was noted
that during the MFS sessions, almost one-half of the pilots did not trim out the almost full
lateral stick deflection until reminded of that option. For example, during a typical F/A18 sortie, the author only trims the aircraft if there is a large asymmetric loadout, or for
landing. Aircraft with such complex flight control systems rarely require pilot trim to
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attain the desired flight condition. The RCLAWS rapid identification and response to
failure onsets is the most enhancing feature of this reconfigurable flight control system.
The second significant lesson learned occurred during the third and fourth
simulations. The rapid departure that occurred at 300 KCAS during the third simulation
was very unexpected for two reasons. First, the author had flown this failure
approximately fifteen times in the simulated environment. During those simulations, the
aircraft was controllable to below 300 KCAS, or if a departure was evident, sideslip
would slowly build unlike the rapid, nose slice departure experienced with RSRI off.
Second and more importantly with the other departures, the pilot had been holding flight
control inputs in that would tell the pilot when a full control deflection was being
reached. In the case of RCLAWS, because the pilot has the stick centered for straight
and level flight and the RCLAWS module is commanding a lateral stick deflection to
oppose the roll off the pilot has no sense of an impending limitation to the control
authority.
This realization led to the second significant finding from the simulations.
Human factors are integral to this system’s successful incorporation into a production
aircraft. In a failure situation, the aircrew will need to know the outputs of the RCLAWS
to the FCCs. Whether it is simply a stick and rudder plot that is displayed on the DDI
when a failure is present, or a numerical output that shows commanded lateral or
longitudinal stick deflection, a display is necessary to communicate to the pilot that
available control authority is approaching a limit. The final simulation case also
demonstrated the importance of human factors. As stated above, the use of trim allowed
for increased control authority and improved handling qualities. The direction or
magnitude of trim required, however, is not always intuitive, especially for multiple
failures. A display for the aircrew, therefore will enable the pilot to reduce the RCLAWS
commanded stick deflection with trim and increase the effective control authority.
Lastly, the second simulation case showed that although the RCLAWS are
designed to be non-interfering, an out of control flight scenario is currently outside the
capabilities of the algorithm. F/A-18 out of control flight procedures dictate that controls
are neutralized and no rudder inputs are commanded. However, post departure, the
RCLAWS algorithm interpreted the centered control stick and no rudder inputs as
straight and level flight when the aircraft was actually out of control. The RCLAWS then
commanded rudder inputs to oppose the buildup in sideslip and lateral and longitudinal
inputs to counter the pitch and roll oscillations associated with an F/A-18 that is out of
control. These commands prevented the production control laws from achieving a rapid
recovery. Further research is needed to prevent RCLAWS from interfering with aircraft
control in regimes where aircraft dynamics are not sufficiently modeled.
RECOMMENDED RCLAWS IMPLEMENTATION FOR LEF FAILURES
Overall, the simulation showed that indeed, the RCLAWS provided a slight
increase in the aircraft handling qualities and allowed the pilot to attain a slower airspeed
prior to departing controlled flight. This will allow an inexperienced or more likely, a
task overloaded pilot, to concentrate on flying the aircraft with known control inputs
instead of commanding almost full lateral stick just to maintain wings level. The reduced
workload will allow the aircrew a better likelihood of being able to fly and possibly
recover the aircraft. Figure 23 and Figure 24 show the relative workload on the pilot as
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Figure 23: CASTLE Simulation, Pilot Stick Position with Production Control Laws and
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indicated by the control stick position with production control laws and RCLAWS,
respectively. In the figures, only the left lateral stick displacement is shown for clarity.
From the figures, it can be concluded that the pilot in command of the RCLAWS aircraft
had the benefits of reduced physical workload in the terms of both failure onset and
follow on control stick inputs required to maintain level flight. RCLAWS, even in the
less powerful in-line configuration, provides a definite improvement over production
control laws and should be incorporated into the F/A-18C to prevent future loss of
aircraft.
The final simulation with RCLAWS and gain override showed the most promise
in terms of the slowest airspeed achieved without the jettison of ordnance and with the
least perceived pilot workload. Ideally, an RCLAWS algorithm integrated into the F/A18C could incorporate the use of gain override when necessary for aircraft control.
Unfortunately, the gain override mechanization in the F/A-18C does not allow for
selection of gain override throughout the entire flight envelope. For example, if gain
override is selected above approximately 350 KCAS, the aircraft begins a divergent pitch
oscillation that can result in the loss of the aircraft. There are still several possibilities to
incorporate the advantages of gain override without endangering the aircraft and crew.
The first is the incorporation a dynamic pressure or airspeed above which the RCLAWS
is prohibited from utilizing gain override in its reconfiguration. When the airspeed is
below the threshold, the RCLAWS would automatically convert to gain override and
display this to the pilot for inclusion in a decision regarding landing. A second method is
to simply allow the RCLAWS to transition to gain override only after the pilot selects
gain override. The author prefers this implementation because it allows the pilot to
remain in the decision matrix on whether or not to select a different gain set. In addition,
it allows for a human to make the decision if it is safe to select the backup mode. If an air
data failure was present that masked the true airspeed of the aircraft, and gain override
was selected outside the known safe envelope, the aircraft would most likely be lost.
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Chapter 9: Conclusions and Recommendations
CONCLUSIONS
Unfortunately the RCLAWS do not return a damaged flight control system to its
original handling qualities. For example, even with RCLAWS engaged, the handling
qualities still averaged a full point lower on the HQR scale for the system with failures.
These limitations are partially due to performing the reconfiguration through increments
to the pilot commands, instead of the flight control surfaces directly. In addition, testing
at low dynamic pressure effectively limits the control power available to the in-line
retrofit system. Simulator testing outside of the modified Class B envelope indicates that
the greatest advantage of the RCLAWS system over the baseline system is realized at
higher Mach numbers with failures of larger magnitude. Nevertheless, RCLAWS
demonstrate both quantitative and qualitative improvements over the production system
in the limited test envelope.
RCLAWS’ greatest contribution to the aircrew was two-fold. First, the
reconfiguration algorithm allowed aircrew to pilot the plane in a manner to which they
were accustomed. The RCLAWS’ contributions from the comparison of the actual
aircraft response and the desired aircraft response permitted familiar control inputs to
result in familiar aircraft motion. This alleviated the difficult task of learning an
aircraft’s new dynamics after a flight control effector failure or aircraft damage. Second,
the RCLAWS’ expeditious response to unanticipated aircraft motion resulting from
damage or failure significantly reduced both the workload and the accompanying
emotional response of the aircrew. Failures were almost transparent to the aircrew at
insertion.
The RCLAWS project also highlighted the importance of two planning factors
that should be incorporated into future F/A-18C projects. First, the test team’s interaction
with the flight clearance process from the beginning of the project substantially
contributed to the results achieved. The test team realized from the start of this project
that effective communication with, and education of, the flight clearance department and
relentless cooperation between the two organizations was vital to the success of this
program. The author believes that this unprecedented involvement and coordination by
both sides should be adapted for future projects.
Second, the effective use of simulation prior to the flight test portion of the
project also led to the success of this program. The piloted software simulation allowed
the team to develop control law changes in a cost effective environment, and to determine
which flight control effector failures provided the best demonstration of RCLAWS
strengths. In addition, proactive use of HILS allowed testing of the actual flight hardware
in a high fidelity simulation of the aircraft’s expected response. The HILS testing not
only allowed the aircrew to become familiar with the expected response, refine test
maneuvers execution and practice emergency procedures, but also allowed the ground
test team to build an efficient routine that would allow for increased success while
airborne. Although simulation and HILS have been used occasionally used during other
test programs, this program demonstrated that research projects with a limited budget can
gain additional experience and knowledge through more widespread use of simulation
and HILS that allows for more efficient programs.
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Lastly, the author’s investigation into an RCLAWS application to a real world
fleet F/A-18C failure revealed that even an aircraft as robust as the F/A-18C can benefit
from reconfigurable flight control technology. Although the test team developed a
technique that allowed the aircraft to recover without the aid of RCLAWS, simulation
showed that with RCLAWS, the probability of a successful recovery rose dramatically
due to the reduced workload and rapid response of the control laws to a failure. As such,
the author contends that incorporation of reconfigurable control law technology into the
F/A-18C will save additional lives and aircraft in the future of this platform.
RECOMMENDATIONS
ALL AXIS RECONFIGURABLE CONTROL
Although there was considerable improvement in the handling qualities of the
F/A-18C with RCLAWS active instead of inactive, as shown by the flight test results, the
simulation results demonstrated that the three input reconfiguration algorithm (lateral and
longitudinal stick and rudder) configuration was more capable than the stick only
reconfiguration. Even though the simulation established that the reduced benefits of the
stick only configuration were acceptable within the Class B envelope, the deficiencies
were still noticeable. The rudder pedal modification compromise, although sometimes
beneficial, had to be secured for half of the testing due to undesirable effects on handling
qualities. As shown in the both NRT simulation results and the real life application, the
importance of the rudder pedal in the algorithm is significant when outside the Class B
envelope. Therefore, future testing should include the benefits of all axis reconfiguration.
INCREASE TEST ENVELOPE
The modified Class B envelope significantly helped to reduce the flight clearance
issues and increase the overall safety margin afforded to this program. Simulation and
flight test results, however, demonstrated that increasing dynamic pressure resulted in
increased control power and thus reconfiguration opportunities. The flight tests with
RCLAWS during this program showed that the software is stable and highly unlikely to
command a flight control surface that would cause an aircraft overstress. Future testing,
even with FSFCCs, should be conducted in an expanded envelope to show the true
capability of RCLAWS to recognize and react to a flight control failure.
AIRCRAFT INCORPORATION
Although the in-line method of reconfiguration is still in its infancy, there are
many benefits that could be realized by its incorporation into any fly by wire aircraft.
The in-line method, however, still requires verification and validation prior to production
incorporation. If this method proves to be easier to certify, installation into aircraft could
yield positive results. Even though the parallel method is more powerful, the in-line
method could be a stepping stone that saves aircraft and lives in the near future. The
flight tests with minor failures, and subsequent simulation testing with an actual fleet
representative failure that caused multiple mishaps, demonstrated this method’s potential
on the highly redundant F/A-18. Future application in both the military and the
commercial sector of aviation could benefit greatly from application of the in-line
approach used during this testing.
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THRUST CONTRIBUTIONS
Several programs in recent years have capitalized on the lessons learned in the
Sioux City crash of United Airlines flight 232, and utilized thrust in the reconfiguration
algorithm. In 1995, an MD-11 landed safely despite sole control from differential and
symmetric thrust from the engines (Tomayako, 2003). Propulsive effects are another
powerful tool that can be used for reconfiguration. With the increasing use of full
authority digital engine control (FADEC) in both civilian and military aviation, electrical
control of the engine could lead to an even more powerful reconfiguration algorithm.
The propulsive effects are slightly less on a fighter aircraft such as the F/A-18 because of
the location of the engines relative to the center of gravity. Nevertheless, the engine
effects are still beneficial and should be incorporated into future retrofit reconfigurable
algorithms on fighter aircraft as demonstrated in the successful landing of the F-15
ACTIVE aircraft under only propulsive affects. Propulsive contributions are more
substantial on a wide body aircraft such as the C-17 or most commercial passenger
aircraft. Unfortunately, this method would also likely result in greater certification
requirements.
FUTURE OF FSFCC TESTING
The FSFCCs provided a relatively easy, cost effective method to test flight
control software. The flight critical nature of the remainder of the envelope required the
use of these innovative devices. Unfortunately, these FCCs were designed and built over
seven years ago. Vast improvements in technology have been made since then that
should allow for increased capabilities in the memory capacity and thus functionality of
the FSFCCs. With a more capable system, the test team could have easily tested a larger
portion of the envelope, even within the modified Class B envelope. In addition, with a
higher computing capacity, the FSFCCs should be able to incorporate all of the latest
safety improvements that have been incorporated into FCS OFP v10.7. Such
incorporation would allow for increased safety while testing with the FSFCCs. Lastly, an
increase in processing capacity of the FSFCCs would allow for a stick and rudder
algorithm that has proven to be more powerful over a wider range of conditions than the
stick only algorithm. Even without improvements, however, test teams should utilize the
FSFCCs for future research projects, especially those with fiscal constraints or tight
deadlines.
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HANDLING QUALITIES RATING SCALE
AIRCRAFT
CHARACTERISTICS

ADEQUACY FOR SELECTED TASK
OR REQUIRED OPERATION*

DEMANDS ON THE PILOT IN SELECTED
TASK OR REQUIRED OPERATION*

PILOT
RATING

Excellent
Highly desireable

Pilot compensation not a factor for
desired performance

1

Good
Negligible deficiencies

Pilot compensation not a factor for
desired performance

2

Fair--some mildly
unpleasant deficiencies

Minimal pilot compensation required for
desired performance

3

Minor but annoying
deficiencies

Desired performance requires moderate
pilot compensation

4

Moderately objectionable
deficiencies

Adequate performance requires
considerable pilot compensation

5

Very objectionable but
tolerable deficiencies

Adequate performance requires extensive
pilot compensation

6

Major Deficiencies

Adequate performance not attainable with
maximum tolerable pilot compensation.
Controllability not in question.

7

Major Deficiencies

Considerable pilot compensation is required
for control

8

Major Deficiencies

Intense pilot compensation is required to
retain control

9

Major Deficiencies

Control will be lost during some portion of
required operation

Yes

Is it
satisfactory without
improvement?

No

Deficiencies
warrant
improvement

Yes
Is adequate
performance attainable
with a tolerable pilot
workload?

No

Deficiencies
require
improvement

Yes

Is
it controllable?

Pilot decisions

No

Improvement
mandatory

10

* Definition of required operation involves designation of flight phase
and/or subphases with accompanying conditions.

Cooper-Harper Ref. NASA TND-5153

Figure A-1 Cooper Harper Handling Qualities Rating Scale
Source: Cooper, G. E.; and Harper, R. P., Jr.: “The Use of Pilot Rating in the Evaluation of Aircraft Handling Qualities,” NASA TN
D-5153, April 1969.
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Figure A-2: Combined Piloted Simulation HQRs
Source: Monaco, J., Ward, D., and Bateman, A., “A Retrofit Architecture for Model-Based Adaptive Flight Control,” AIAA 20046281, AIAA 1st Intelligent Systems Technical Conference, Chicago, IL, September 2004.
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Figure A-3: CASTLE Simulation Scoring Criteria
Source: Ward, D., and Monaco, J., “System Identification for Retrofit Reconfigurable Control of an F/A-18,” Journal of Aircraft, Vol.
42, No. 1, 2005, pp. 63-72.
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Figure A-4: F/A-18 CASTLE Simulation results for NRT Transonic Test Point (30,000 feet and 0.9 Mach)
Source: Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and Flight Testing of Adaptive Flight Control
Systems for Existing Aircraft,” Draft Report, March 2006.
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Figure A-5: F/A-18 CASTLE Simulation results for NRT Class B Test Point (20,000 feet and 0.3 Mach)
Source: Monaco, J., “Retrofit Reconfigurable Control System for the F/A-18:Design and Flight Testing of Adaptive Flight Control
Systems for Existing Aircraft,” Draft Report, March 2006.
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Table B-1: Envelope Engage Limits
Parameter
Upper
Engage
Limit

Lower
Engage
Limit

Pitch Rate
(degrees/sec)

PA Entry 1
PA Entry 2
PA Entry 3
UA Entry 1
UA Entry 2
UA Entry 3

5.0
10.0
15.0
15.0
30.0
50.0

-5.0
-10.0
-15.0
-15.0
-30.0
-50.0

Roll Rate
(degrees/sec)

PA Entry 1
PA Entry 2
PA Entry 3
UA Entry 1
UA Entry 2
UA Entry 3

20.0
40.0
60.0
100.0
150.0
200.0

-20.0
-40.0
-60.0
-100.0
-150.0
-200.0

Yaw Rate
(degrees/sec)

PA Entry 1
PA Entry 2
PA Entry 3
UA Entry 1
UA Entry 2
UA Entry 3

5.0
10.0
15.0
5.0
15.0
25.0

-5.0
-10.0
-15.0
-5.0
-15.0
-25.0

Normal
Acceleration
(g-s)

PA Entry 1
PA Entry 2
PA Entry 3
UA Entry 1
UA Entry 2
UA Entry 3

1.5
1.8
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0

0.5
0.2
0.0
0.0
-1.0
-2.0

Lateral Acceleration
(g-s)

PA Entry 1
PA Entry 2
PA Entry 3
UA Entry 1
UA Entry 2
UA Entry 3

0.25
0.5
0.75
0.5
0.75
1.0

-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-0.5
-0.75
-1.0
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Parameter

Table B-1: continued
Upper
Engage
Limit

Lower
Engage
Limit

Angle-of-Attack
(degrees)

PA Entry 1
PA Entry 2
PA Entry 3
UA Entry 1
UA Entry 2
UA Entry 3

10.0
15.0
20.0
30.0
35.0
40.0

5.0
0.0
-5.0
0.0
-5.0
-10.0

Impact Pressure
(psf)

PA Entry 1
PA Entry 2
PA Entry 3
UA Entry 1
UA Entry 2
UA Entry 3

85
140
213
204
213
219

28
50
67
35
40
60

Static Pressure
(psf)

PA Entry 1
PA Entry 2
PA Entry 3
UA Entry 1
UA Entry 2
UA Entry 3
PA Entry 1
PA Entry 2
PA Entry 3
UA Entry 1
UA Entry 2
UA Entry 3

1360
1455
1540
975
1195
1760
45
60
90
45
60
90

785
975
1195
540
630
730
-45
-60
-90
-45
-60
-90

Bank Angle
(degrees)

PA Entry 1
25000
10000
PA Entry 2
30000
12000
PA Entry 3
35000
15000
UA Entry 1
25000
10000
UA Entry 2
30000
12000
35000
15000
UA Entry 3
(1) Boldfaced parameters are engaged by default
and will remain engaged throughout the test
program.
(2) Boldfaced limits are defaults.
(3) Grayed-out entries are outside of other limits
(NATOPS, Flight Clearance, modified Class B),
and will not be used.

Altitude
(feet)

Notes:
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AOA/Air Data Fail
1750A No Go Indication
Actuator Failure
Dual Discrete Fail
Quad Discrete Fail
Quad Sensor Fail
1750A Processor Failures
Dual Port Ram Invalid
MUX Bus Invalid
DEL/MECH Mode Engaged
Master Caution set by FCC
Channel OFF
RFCS Data Not Ready
RFCS Command not Valid
Manual SPIN Selected
SPIN Mode
Heading Hold Requested or Engaged
* All parameters must be false to arm or engage.
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

1750A-monitored
Engage Criterion

701E-monitored
Engage Criterion

Criterion*

701E-monitored
Arm Criterion

Table B-2: System Status Arming and Engaging Criteria

X
X
X

Table B-3: FSFCC Version 3.1.6 Mode Selections
Table B-3: FSFCC Version 3.1.6 Mode Selections

Sequence

Table
Row
Number Number

Description

A

0

0

Slimmed F/A-18 Replication Mode

CBBB
CBBC
CBBD
CBCB
CBCC
CBCD
CBDB
CBDC
CBDD
CCBB
CCBC
CCBD
CCCB
CCCC
CCCD

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Pitch Rate Check Enabled
Pitch Rate Check Disabled
Reset Pitch Rate Parameters to Nominal Values
Pitch Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Pitch Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Pitch Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Pitch Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Pitch Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Pitch Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3
Pitch Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Pitch Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Pitch Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Pitch Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Pitch Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Pitch Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3

DBBB
DBBC
DBBD
DBCB
DBCC
DBCD
DBDB
DBDC
DBDD
DCBB
DCBC
DCBD
DCCB
DCCC
DCCD

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Roll Rate Check Enabled
Roll Rate Check Disabled
Reset Roll Rate Parameters to Nominal Values
Roll Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Roll Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Roll Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Roll Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Roll Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Roll Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3
Roll Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Roll Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Roll Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Roll Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Roll Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Roll Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3

CBBBB
CBBBC
CBBBD
CBBCB
CBBCC
CBBCD
CBBDB
CBBDC
CBBDD
CBCBB
CBCBC

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Yaw Rate Check Enabled
Yaw Rate Check Disabled
Reset Yaw Rate Parameters to Nominal Values
Yaw Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Yaw Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Yaw Rate Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Yaw Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Yaw Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Yaw Rate Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3
Yaw Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Yaw Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
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Sequence

Table
Row
Number Number

Table B-3. Continued.
Description

BCBD
CBCCB
CBCCC
CBCCD

3
3
3
3

11
12
13
14

Yaw Rate Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Yaw Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Yaw Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Yaw Rate Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3

CCBBB
CCBBC
CCBBD
CCBCB
CCBCC
CCBCD
CCBDB
CCBDC
CCBDD
CCCBB
CCCBC
CCCBD
CCCCB
CCCCC
CCCCD

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Nz Check Enabled
Nz Check Disabled
Reset Nz Parameters to Nominal Values
Nz Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Nz Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Nz Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Nz Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Nz Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Nz Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3
Nz Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Nz Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Nz Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Nz Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Nz Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Nz Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3

CDBBB
CDBBC
CDBBD
CDBCB

5
5
5
5

0
1
2
3

CDBCC

5

4

CDBCD

5

5

CDBDB

5

6

CDBDC

5

7

CDBDD

5

8

CDCBB

5

9

CDCBC

5

10

CDCBD

5

11

CDCCB

5

12

CDCCC

5

13

Lateral Acceleration Check Enabled
Lateral Acceleration Check Disabled
Reset Lateral Acceleration Parameters to Nominal Values
Lateral Acceleration Upper Engage Limit Table UA
Entry 1
Lateral Acceleration Upper Engage Limit Table UA
Entry 2
Lateral Acceleration Upper Engage Limit Table UA
Entry 3
Lateral Acceleration Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry
1
Lateral Acceleration Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry
2
Lateral Acceleration Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry
3
Lateral Acceleration Lower Engage Limit Table UA
Entry 1
Lateral Acceleration Lower Engage Limit Table UA
Entry 2
Lateral Acceleration Lower Engage Limit Table UA
Entry 3
Lateral Acceleration Lower Engage Limit Table PA
Entry 1
Lateral Acceleration Lower Engage Limit Table PA
Entry 2
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Sequence

Row
Table
Number Number

Table B-3. Continued.
Description

CDCCD

5

14

Lateral Acceleration Lower Engage Limit Table PA
Entry 3

DBBBB
DBBBC
DBBBD
DBBCB
DBBCC
DBBCD
DBBDB
DBBDC
DBBDD
DBCBB
DBCBC
DBCBD
DBCCB
DBCCC
DBCCD

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Angle-of-Attack Check Enabled
Angle-of-Attack Check Disabled
Reset Angle-of-Attack Parameters to Nominal Values
Angle-of-Attack Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Angle-of-Attack Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Angle-of-Attack Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Angle-of-Attack Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Angle-of-Attack Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Angle-of-Attack Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3
Angle-of-Attack Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Angle-of-Attack Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Angle-of-Attack Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Angle-of-Attack Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Angle-of-Attack Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Angle-of-Attack Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3

DCBBB
DCBBC
DCBBD
DCBCB
DCBCC
DCBCD
DCBDB
DCBDC
DCBDD
DCCBB
DCCBC
DCCBD
DCCCB
DCCCC
DCCCD

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Impact Pressure Check Enabled
Impact Pressure Check Disabled
Reset Impact Pressure Parameters to Nominal Values
Impact Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Impact Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Impact Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Impact Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Impact Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Impact Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3
Impact Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Impact Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Impact Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Impact Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Impact Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Impact Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3

DDBBB
DDBBC
DDBBD
DDBCB
DDBCC
DDBCD
DDBDB
DDBDC
DDBDD
DDCBB
DDCBC

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Static Pressure Check Enabled
Static Pressure Check Disabled
Reset Static Pressure Parameters to Nominal Values
Static Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Static Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Static Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Static Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Static Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Static Pressure Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3
Static Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Static Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
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Sequence

Row
Table
Number Number

Table B-3. Continued.
Description

DDCBD
DDCCB
DDCCC
DDCCD

8
8
8
8

11
12
13
14

Static Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Static Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Static Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Static Pressure Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3

CBBBBB
CBBBBC
CBBBBD
CBBBCB
CBBBCC
CBBBCD
CBBBDB
CBBBDC
CBBBDD
CBBCBB
CBBCBC
CBBCBD
CBBCCB
CBBCCC
CBBCCD

9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Bank Angle Check Enabled
Bank Angle Check Disabled
Reset Bank Angle Parameters to Nominal Values
Bank Angle Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Bank Angle Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Bank Angle Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Bank Angle Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Bank Angle Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Bank Angle Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3
Bank Angle Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Bank Angle Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Bank Angle Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Bank Angle Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Bank Angle Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Bank Angle Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3

CBCBBB
CBCBBC
CBCBBD
CBCBCB
CBCBCC
CBCBCD
CBCBDB
CBCBDC
CBCBDD
CBCCBB
CBCCBC
CBCCBD
CBCCCB
CBCCCC
CBCCCD

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Altitude Check Enabled
Altitude Check Disabled
Reset Altitude Parameters to Nominal Values
Altitude Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Altitude Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Altitude Upper Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Altitude Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Altitude Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Altitude Upper Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3
Altitude Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 1
Altitude Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 2
Altitude Lower Engage Limit Table UA Entry 3
Altitude Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 1
Altitude Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 2
Altitude Lower Engage Limit Table PA Entry 3

CCBBBB
CCBBBC
CCBBBD

12
12
12

0
1
2

Reset All Parameters to Nominal Values
Enable All Limit Checks
Disable All Limit Checks

CCCBBB
CCCBBC
CCCBBD

13
13
13

0
1
2

Ground Test Mode OFF
Ground Test Mode ON - Disable Envelope Checks
Ground Test Mode ON
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Sequence

Row
Table
Number Number
14-19

Not Used

DBDBBB

20

0

DBDBBC

20

1

DBDBBD

20

2

DBDBDB

20

6

DBDBDC

20

7

DBDBDD

20

8

DCBBBC
DCBBBD

21
21

1
2

22

0-12

22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

23

0-12

23
23
23

13
14
15

DCCCCC
DCCCCD
DCCCDB
DCCCDC
DCCCDD
DCCDBB
DCCDBC
DCCDBD
DCCDCB
DCCDCC
DCCDCD
DCCDDB
DCCDDC

DCDCCC
DCDCCD
DCDCDB

Table B-3. Continued.
Description

Retrofit Gain Set No. 1 (Nominal),
Trim Maneuver Mod. Disabled (= 0),
Rudder Pedal Mod. Disabled (= 0)
Retrofit Gain Set No. 2 (4/3 x Nominal),
Trim Maneuver Mod. Disabled (= 0),
Rudder Pedal Mod. Disabled (= 0)
Retrofit Gain Set No. 2 (5/3 x Nominal),
Trim Maneuver Mod. Disabled (= 0),
Rudder Pedal Mod. Disabled (= 0)
Retrofit Gain Set No. 1 (Nominal),
Trim Maneuver Mod. Disabled (= 0),
Rudder Pedal Mod. Enabled (= 1)
Retrofit Gain Set No. 2 (4/3 x Nominal),
Trim Maneuver Mod. Disabled (= 0),
Rudder Pedal Mod. Enabled (= 1)
Retrofit Gain Set No. 2 (5/3 x Nominal),
Trim Maneuver Mod. Disabled (= 0),
Rudder Pedal Mod. Enabled (= 1)
Retrofit Control Only
Retrofit Control Stand Alone Test (Ground Test only)
FAIL R Stabilator Absolute Failures (not used)
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator

0 deg Offset
+1 deg Offset
+2 deg Offset
+3 deg Offset
+4 deg Offset
+5 deg Offset
+6 deg Offset
-1 deg Offset
-2 deg Offset
-3 deg Offset
-4 deg Offset
-5 deg Offset
-6 deg Offset

Retrofit - FAIL R Stabilator Absolute Failures (not
used)
Retrofit - FAIL R Stabilator 0 deg Offset
Retrofit - FAIL R Stabilator +1 deg Offset
Retrofit - FAIL R Stabilator +2 deg Offset
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Sequence
DCDCDC
DCDCDD
DCDDBB
DCDDBC
DCDDBD
DCDDCB
DCDDCC
DCDDCD
DCDDDB
DCDDDC

DDBCCC
DDBCCD
DDBCDB
DDBCDC
DDBCDD
DDBDBB
DDBDBC
DDBDBD
DDBDCB
DDBDCC
DDBDCD
DDBDDB
DDBDDC

DDCCCC
DDCCCD
DDCCDB
DDCCDC
DDCCDD
DDCDBB
DDCDBC
DDCDBD
DDCDCB
DDCDCC
DDCDCD
DDCDDB
DDCDDC

Row
Table
Number Number
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

24

0-12

24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

25

0-12

25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Table B-3. Continued.
Description
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit

-

FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator
FAIL R Stabilator

+3 deg Offset
+4 deg Offset
+5 deg Offset
+6 deg Offset
-1 deg Offset
-2 deg Offset
-3 deg Offset
-4 deg Offset
-5 deg Offset
-6 deg Offset

FAIL R Aileron Absolute Failures (not used)
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron

0 deg Offset
+5 deg Offset
+10 deg Offset
+15 deg Offset
+20 deg Offset
+25 deg Offset
+30 deg Offset
-5 deg Offset
-10 deg Offset
-15 deg Offset
-20 deg Offset
-25 deg Offset
-30 deg Offset

Retrofit - FAIL R Aileron Absolute Failures (not used)
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit
Retrofit

-

FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron
FAIL R Aileron

74

0 deg Offset
+5 deg Offset
+10 deg Offset
+15 deg Offset
+20 deg Offset
+25 deg Offset
+30 deg Offset
-5 deg Offset
-10 deg Offset
-15 deg Offset
-20 deg Offset
-25 deg Offset
-30 deg Offset

Table B-4:Detailed Test Matrix
Table B-4:Detailed Test Matrix

Test Point
Number
1100
1101
1110
1111
1120
1121
1130
1131
1140
1141
1150
1151
1160
1161
1200
1201
1210
1211
1220
1221
1230
1231
1240
1241
1250
1251

Maneuver
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Guns Tracking
Guns Tracking
Guns Tracking
Guns Tracking
Guns Tracking
Guns Tracking
Guns Tracking
Guns Tracking
Guns Tracking
Guns Tracking
Guns Tracking
Guns Tracking

Configuration
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR

Altitude Airspeed
(Feet Hp) (KCAS)
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000

235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
235
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AOA
(deg)

FSFCC Mode(2)
Failure(4,5)
RCLAWS
(Surface, mag)
None
Inactive
None
Active
Aileron, 0 deg
Inactive
Aileron, 0 deg
Active
Aileron, 15 deg
Inactive
Aileron, 15 deg
Active
Aileron, 30 deg
Inactive
Aileron, 30 deg
Active
Stab, 0 deg
Inactive
Stab, 0 deg
Active
Stab, 3 deg
Inactive
Stab, 3 deg
Active
Stab, 6 deg
Inactive
Stab, 6 deg
Active
None
Inactive
None
Active
Aileron, 0 deg
Inactive
Aileron, 0 deg
Active
Aileron, 15 deg
Inactive
Aileron, 15 deg
Active
Aileron, 30 deg
Inactive
Aileron, 30 deg
Active
Stab, 0 deg
Inactive
Stab, 0 deg
Active
Stab, 3 deg
Inactive
Stab, 3 deg
Active

Remarks

Test Point
Number
1260
1261
2100
2101
2110
2111
2120
2121
2130
2131
2140
2141
2150
2151
2160
2161
2200
2201
2210
2211
2220
2221
2230
2231
2240
2241
2250

Maneuver
Guns Tracking
Guns Tracking
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Waveoff
Waveoff
Waveoff
Waveoff
Waveoff
Waveoff
Waveoff
Waveoff
Waveoff
Waveoff
Waveoff

Configuration
CR
CR
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA

Table B-4. Continued.
Altitude Airspeed AOA
(Feet Hp) (KCAS) (deg)
20,000
235
20,000
235
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1(3)
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1(3)
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1(3)
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1(3)
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1(3)
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1(3)
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1(3)
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1(3)
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1(3)
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1(3)
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1(3)
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1(3)
16,000
8.1
76

FSFCC Mode(2)
Stab, 6 deg
Stab, 6 deg
None
None
Aileron, 0 deg
Aileron, 0 deg
Aileron, 15 deg
Aileron, 15 deg
Aileron, 30 deg
Aileron, 30 deg
Stab, 0 deg
Stab, 0 deg
Stab, 3 deg
Stab, 3 deg
Stab, 6 deg
Stab, 6 deg
None
None
Aileron, 0 deg
Aileron, 0 deg
Aileron, 15 deg
Aileron, 15 deg
Aileron, 30 deg
Aileron, 30 deg
Stab, 0 deg
Stab, 0 deg
Stab, 3 deg

Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive

Remarks

HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only

Test Point
Number
2251
2260
2261
3100
3101
3110
3111
3120
3121
3130
3131
3140
3141
3150
3151
3160
3161
3200
3201
3210
3211
3220
3221
3230
3231
3240
3241

Maneuver
Waveoff
Waveoff
Waveoff
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
Integrated Test Set(1)
SSE Waveoff
SSE Waveoff
SSE Waveoff
SSE Waveoff
SSE Waveoff
SSE Waveoff
SSE Waveoff
SSE Waveoff
SSE Waveoff
SSE Waveoff

Configuration
PA
PA
PA
PA1/2
PA1/2
PA1/2
PA1/2
PA1/2
PA1/2
PA1/2
PA1/2
PA1/2
PA1/2
PA1/2
PA1/2
PA1/2
PA1/2
SSE
SSE
SSE
SSE
SSE
SSE
SSE
SSE
SSE
SSE

Table B-4. Continued.
Altitude Airspeed AOA
(Feet Hp) (KCAS) (deg)
16,000
8.1(3)
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1(3)
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
16,000
8.1
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FSFCC Mode(2)
Stab, 3 deg
Stab, 6 deg
Stab, 6 deg
None
None
Aileron, 0 deg
Aileron, 0 deg
Aileron, 15 deg
Aileron, 15 deg
Aileron, 30 deg
Aileron, 30 deg
Stab, 0 deg
Stab, 0 deg
Stab, 3 deg
Stab, 3 deg
Stab, 6 deg
Stab, 6 deg
None
None
Aileron, 0 deg
Aileron, 0 deg
Aileron, 15 deg
Aileron, 15 deg
Aileron, 30 deg
Aileron, 30 deg
Stab, 0 deg
Stab, 0 deg

Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active
Inactive
Active

Remarks
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only
HILS only

Table B-4. Continued.
Test Point
Maneuver
ConfigAltitude Airspeed AOA
FSFCC Mode(2)
Remarks
Number
uration
(Feet Hp) (KCAS) (deg)
3250 SSE Waveoff
SSE
16,000
8.1 Stab, 3 deg
Inactive
HILS only
3251 SSE Waveoff
SSE
16,000
8.1 Stab, 3 deg
Active
HILS only
3260 SSE Waveoff
SSE
16,000
8.1 Stab, 6 deg
Inactive
HILS only
3261 SSE Waveoff
SSE
16,000
8.1 Stab, 6 deg
Active
HILS only
NOTES: (1) Integrated Test Set consists of pitch doublets, pitch attitude captures, bank-to-bank rolls, and optional heading captures.
Specific procedures for each maneuver are described in the DMOT.
(2) The FSFCC 1750A research processor will be engaged for all test points. The RCLAWS will be active where
designated, and the Failure Sim module will be active where designated.
(3) Monitor sideslip when above 150 KCAS with RCLAWS active in PA Half or Full.
(4) Failure magnitudes are specified, but direction will be at the discretion of the test team.
(5) Test points may be inserted with intermediate failure magnitudes (Stab, 4 deg, for example) to provide additional
buildup.
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Table B-5: Flight Test Maneuver Descriptions and Tolerances

Smooth
CR(1)

Aggressive
Guns Tracking

Smooth
(2)

Pitch Attitude Capture
Capture ±5˚ within ±1˚ (desired) or
±2˚ (adequate) with ΔNz>2g in 1
second

Bank-to-Bank
(Bank Angle Capture)
Capture ±30˚ within ±5˚ (desired) or
±10˚ (adequate) with ¼ stick in 1
second

Capture ±5˚ within ±2˚ (desired) or
Capture ±45˚ within ±10˚ (desired)
±3˚ (adequate) with ΔNz>2g in ½
or ±20˚ (adequate) with ½ stick in ¼
second
second
Acquisition (coarse): stabilize within 1.5 heading carets within 2 seconds
(desired) or 4 seconds (adequate)
Tracking (fine): stabilize for 3 seconds (desired) or 1 seconds (adequate)
Capture ±5˚ within ±1˚ (desired) or
Capture ±15˚ within ±2˚ (desired) or
±2˚ (adequate) with ΔNz>2g in 1
±4˚ (adequate) with ¼ stick in 1
second
second

PA

Aggressive

Capture ±5˚ within ±2˚ (desired) or
±3˚ (adequate) with ΔNz>2g in ½
second

Capture ±30˚ within ±5˚ (desired) or
±10˚ (adequate) with ½ stick in ¼
second

(1) CR: 20,000 feet / 235 KCAS
(2) PA: 16,000 feet / 8.1 degrees AOA
Entry conditions for all maneuvers are straight and level, ±1000 feet altitude, ±10 KCAS airspeed, and
±2 deg AOA.
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Appendix C: FCS DIFFERENCES
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FCS CHANGES
Changes to the Flight Control System software between versions 10.1, 10.3, and
10.5.1 are described below and summarized in Table C-1.
VERSION 10.3 = V10.1 + the following:
a. Added a number of TACAN/VORTAC/INS waypoint coupled-steering modes.
b. Added a source-error correction table for use when airplane is configured with
Recce nose.
c. Added Memory Inspect of Unpopulated 701e Memory, which corrects a lab-test
only problem which caused all 4 FCC channels to go into a fault routine that
equates to MECH/OFF/OFF mode (can be manually reset).
VERSION 10.5.1 = V10.3 + the following:
a. Takeoff Trim Button Stabilator Setting, which changes takeoff trim button
setting from 4˚ TEU trim to 12˚ TEU trim.
b. Flight Control System Actuator Signal Recovery Logic, which changes FCS
hydraulic pressure recovery logic from time-proportional resumption (5
seconds) of actuator command to rate-proportional command.
c. Air Data Sensor FCC Channel Tracking, which adds a PBIT test and BLIN
codes to improve failure isolation of miss-track between two FCC channels for
both Qc and Ps ADC data.
d. Uncommanded Yaw With Loss of Rudder Toe-In Due To Rudder Actuator
Failure, which modifies the fade-to-zero rudder toe-in command schedule of
good rudder to better match the time for the failed rudder to move to the faired
position.
e. Jammed Angle-Of-Attack Probe Fault Detection, which changes flight-control
AOA redundancy management to use an alternate AOA reference if a probesplit is detected while the aircraft is weight-on-wheels.
ENVELOPE CHANGES
There are no changes to the NATOPS flight envelope between FCS versions 10.1,
10.3, and 10.5.1.
APPLICABLE WARNINGS/CAUTIONS/NOTES
With FCS v10.3 and below, if an AOA probe split greater than 15.5 deg occurs,
FCC AOA is set to the last valid value before the split occurred. During field takeoffs a
single probe jammed at a large AOA can significantly delay nose wheel liftoff.
Depending on the last average value selected by the FCC, the pilot may not be able to
counter this FCC feedback, even with full aft stick. Aircrew should pay particular
attention to projected nose wheel liftoff speed and maximum abort speed.
A warning was added to the test plan that states: “If the damaged/stuck AOA
probe is stuck at greater than 30 degrees, the stabilators are commanded to full nose down
and there is insufficient control stick authority to recover the aircraft”
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Function
Inner Loop
Control Laws
Redundancy/
Failure
Management

Table C-1: Summary of 10.1/10.3/10.5.1 FCS Differences
v10.1 to v10.3 changes
v10.3 to v10.5.1 changes
None
None
Actuator signal recovery logic
changed to resume actuator
command when reset
Added air data sensor channel
tracking between partner
channels
Modified fade-to-zero rudder
toe-in schedule to better match
failed rudder
Added AOA probe fault
detection logic
Takeoff trim setting changed
from 4 degrees TEU to 12
degrees TEU

Takeoff Trim
Source Error
Correction (SEC)
Autopilot

New SEC table for RECCE
nose
Additional
TACAN/VORTAC/INS
waypoint-coupled modes

For FCS versions 10.1 through 10.5.1, cross control inputs are prohibited above
150 knots with flaps FULL. This prohibition is due to the possibility of building sideslip.
With the RCLAWS engaged, the FSFCC is capable of commanding a cross control
situation above 150 KCAS, possibly violating this prohibition. For this reason, the
project flight clearance allows cross control inputs above 150 KCAS with the ground
team monitoring sideslip. The monitoring engineer will call knock-it-off in the event that
sideslip meets or exceeds 10 degrees during any maneuver.
APPLICABLE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES CHANGES
For any in-flight or ground emergencies, disengage the FSFCC with the paddle
switch and follow NATOPS procedures. In the event of a departure from controlled
flight with v10.1, spin arrows may rapidly cycle left/right during highly oscillatory poststall gyrations, spins, or spin recovery. If cycling of command arrows continues and a
spin is confirmed, Spin Recovery Mode (SRM) should be manually selected. For both
intermediate and high yaw rate spin mode recoveries, removal of the command arrows
from the SRM display may be delayed a few seconds after spin yaw rate has stopped and
the AOA warning tone is no longer present. Under these conditions, maintaining full
lateral stick until the command arrow disappears may delay spin recovery, lead to a
redeparture, and lead to excessive altitude loss (1000 to 2000 feet). When the pilot has
confirmed that yaw rate has decreased to zero, anti-spin controls should be neutralized,
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even if a sustained command arrow is present. This minimizes altitude loss during
recovery. Higher yaw rates lead to longer command arrow delays during spin recovery.
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Appendix D: DETAILED METHOD OF TEST
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FSFCC CHECKOUT
Each time the FSFCCs are installed, a set of BITs will be performed. The general
procedure will be as follows:
1. Ensure the aircraft is free of flight control failures prior to the installation of
FSFCCs:
Prior to the installation of the FSFCCs, a Flight Controls pre-flight IBIT and a
full Maintenance BIT will be run on the project aircraft. Any Flight Controls
X’s or BLIN codes will be recorded. The test team will analyze any BLIN
codes to determine whether any FCS degrades will compromise the value of
the rest of the checkout.
2. Verify proper FSFCC operation in the project aircraft using pre-flight Initiated
BIT and Maintenance BIT prior to flight:
The production FCCs will be removed from the project aircraft, and the
FSFCCs will be installed. A flight controls Initiated BIT and Maintenance
BIT will be performed. The operator will record any flight controls X’s or
BLIN codes and report them to the test team.
PREFLIGHT FSFCC CHECKS
The following checks will be performed by the pilot prior to each flight (DAF
sequences are valid for FSFCC v3.1.6):
1. Verify MC OFP via the software configuration page.
2. Verify the FSFCC production software via the software configuration page. Both
FCCA and FCCB should indicate 991.
3. Verify FSFCC research software version via memory inspect.
4. Enable DAF.
5. Enable FTFCS display.
6. Program the DAF push tiles “A”, “B”, “C”, and “D” to command [table, row]
numbers [1,1], [2,2], [3,3], and [4,4], respectively.
7. Attempt to arm the FSFCC mode “DDBCCB”, right aileron fail to 30 deg TEU
absolute. The FSFCC cannot be armed on the ground without using the Ground
Test settings. The pilot will verify the fail to arm in the cockpit and the flight
controls engineer at RTPS will verify the proper fail to arm indications are
displayed at RTPS.
8. Enter FSFCC mode “CCCBBC”, Ground Test Mode without envelope checks
ON, and engage mode “A”, Slimmed Replication mode. Both the pilot and
engineers will verify they see the proper engage indications, and the engineers at
RTPS will give a “Disengage” call. The pilot will press the paddle switch, and
both the pilot and engineers at RTPS will verify the system disengages and the
proper indications are provided.
9. Enter FSFCC mode “CCCBBB” to turn Ground Test Mode OFF.
10. Disable FTFCS display for takeoff.
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TAKEOFF
Takeoff will be performed in accordance with NATOPS except for the addition of
the following two steps.
1. Ensure stabilator trim is set to 12 degrees TEU.
2. Ensure production FCS page is displayed.
3. Above 50 KCAS during the takeoff roll, cross check the L/R AOA probe
indications on the FCS display. Abort the takeoff if either left or right AOA is
outside the range of ±10 degrees, or if the split between left and right exceeds
10 degrees.
FSFCC AUTOMATIC DISENGAGE LOGIC VERIFICATION PROCEDURE
During the first flight of the test program, the FSFCC automatic disengage logic
will be verified prior to the execution of any test points. The disengage logic verification
procedure may be accomplished enroute to the range area or after established in the range
area at or above 15,000 feet MSL, at approximately 235 KCAS. The pilot will engage
the FSFCC prior to each of the following steps in 1.0 g level flight and verify that the
FSFCC disengages appropriately during each step. The disengage logic verification
procedure will consist of the following:
a. Set Yaw Rate disengage limits to ±5 degrees/second and Nz disengage limits
to +3.0/0.0 g.
b. Pedal Input (full rudder deflection to exceed ±5 degrees/second yaw rate
disengage limit).
c. + 3.2 g steady state pull-up.
d. –0.5 g steady state pushover.
e. Modify disengage parameters as required for first test point.
TEST MANEUVERS
Integrated Test Set
Description:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Pitch Doublet
Pitch Attitude Capture
Bank-to-Bank Rolls
Heading Capture (may or may not be performed based on test
team’s assessment of value added)

All maneuvers are described below.
Pitch Doublets
Description:

1. Establish the specified initial conditions.
2. Perform a ¼ stick (<1-g disturbance) sinusoidal longitudinal stick
doublet and allow subsequent motions to subside or pitch
oscillation amplitude to double before making any further control
inputs.
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3. If motion is controllable and well damped, repeat with ½ stick
input (<1-g disturbance).
Success Criteria: •
•
•
•
•

Maneuver begins within 5 KCAS or 0.02 Mach and 1,000 feet of
specified initial conditions.
Stick doublet input symmetric within 1/4 in.
Total doublet time is greater than 1/2 second.
Less than 1-g disturbance.
Motions subsided when either damped to less than 2% of
disturbance, fifth oscillation, or motion results in angle twice that
of released condition.

Purpose:

•
•
•

Controllability
Magnitude of longitudinal/lateral/directional coupling
Longitudinal stability

Rationale:

•

Buildup maneuver to check longitudinal characteristics.

Flying Qualities Criteria:
Desired:
• No yaw or roll coupled motions.
• No PIO tendency.
Adequate:
• Yaw or roll coupled motions are minor and predictable.
• Bounded PIO damps immediately if input is relaxed.
Controllability:
• Any unexpected or unpredictable normal acceleration or pitch rate
response which requires full stick to counter.
• Any divergent PIO.
• Any bounded PIO which diverges after input is relaxed.
• Uncontrollable coupled roll or yaw response.
Pitch Attitude Capture
Description:

1. Establish the specified initial conditions.
2. Using a fixed pipper-type reference on the HUD and in a smooth,
non-aggressive manner (Δg ≤ 2 g in 1 second) attempt to acquire a
± 5 degrees pitch attitude change.
3. Re-establish the initial trim conditions.
4. In a moderately aggressive manner (Δg ≤ 2 g in ≤ 1/2 second)
attempt to acquire a ± 5 degrees pitch attitude change.
Note: Pitch attitude captures should only be performed in a wings
level attitude. The tendency for PIO must be explored by
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aggressively zeroing the error between pipper and desired pitch
attitude. If stabilization or PIO problems develop, lowering the
input rate is allowable but should be cited as pilot compensation
and described.
Success Criteria: •

Maneuver begins within 5 KCAS or 0.02 Mach and 1,000 feet of
specified initial conditions.

Purpose:

•

Pilot Induced Oscillation (PIO) tendencies.

Rationale:

•

Pitch attitude changes of ± 5 degrees are appropriately
accomplished with smooth inputs defined in terms of a Δg ≤ 2 g in
1 second onset rate. Faster pitch attitude changes (Δg ≤ 2 g in ≤ 1/2
second) also need be evaluated, but large, fast inputs are
unreasonable with a degraded flight control system.

Flying Qualities Criteria:
Desired:
• Acquire target pitch attitude within ± 1 degrees for smooth inputs
and within ± 2 degrees for more aggressive inputs
• No yaw or roll coupled motions.
• No PIO tendency.
• Overshoots do not exceed 4 degrees.
Adequate:
• Acquire target pitch attitude within ± 2 degrees for smooth inputs
and within ± 3 degrees for more aggressive inputs
• Bounded PIO damps immediately if input is relaxed.
Controllability:
• Any unexpected or unpredictable normal acceleration or pitch rate
response which requires full forward stick to counter.
• Any divergent PIO.
• Any bounded PIO which diverges after input is relaxed.
• Uncontrollable coupled roll or yaw response.
Bank-to-Bank Rolls
Description:

1. Establish the specified initial conditions.
2. Smoothly roll the aircraft and attempt to capture a 30 degrees bank
angle (15 degrees in PA1/2 or PA).
3. Smoothly roll the aircraft and attempt to capture the opposite 30
degrees bank angle (15 degrees in PA1/2 or PA).
4. Smoothly roll back to the wings-level attitude and re-establish the
initial conditions.
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5. Aggressively roll the aircraft and attempt to capture a 45 degrees
bank angle (30 degrees in PA1/2 or PA).
6. Aggressively roll the aircraft and attempt to capture the opposite
45 degrees bank angle (30 degrees in PA1/2 or PA).
7. Aggressively roll back to the wings-level attitude and re-establish
the initial trim condition.
Note: Roll attitude should be acquired and maintained
using the same input rate used to start the roll to zero any error
between desired and actual roll attitude. Smooth input implies ≈ 1
second to reach 1/4 stick input. Aggressive input implies a 1/2
lateral stick input in ≤ 1/4 second. After the initial input, any error
should be corrected by the pilot in the minimum time possible. If
stabilization or PIO problems develop, lowering the input rate is
allowable but must be cited as pilot compensation and described.
The HUD and the outside visual scene should be used jointly to
judge the roll angle.
Success Criteria: •
•

Maneuver begins within 5 KCAS or 0.02 Mach and 1,000 feet of
specified initial conditions.
Specified lateral stick within 1/4 second for abrupt inputs.

Purpose:

•
•

Roll mode characteristics
PIO tendencies

Rationale:

•
•

Mission representative flying qualities task.
Smooth lateral stick inputs are normal for small bank angle
changes while aggressive lateral stick inputs are common for large
bank angle changes.

Flying Qualities Criteria:
Desired:
• Acquire specified bank angle within ± 5 degrees (± 2 degrees in
PA1/2 or PA) for smooth inputs and within ± 10 degrees (± 5
degrees in PA1/2 or PA) for aggressive inputs.
• No PIO tendency.
• No coupled pitch motion.
Adequate:
• Acquire specified bank angle within 10 degrees (± 4 degrees in
PA1/2 or PA) for smooth inputs and within ± 20 degrees (± 10
degrees in PA1/2 or PA) for aggressive inputs.
Controllability:
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•
•
•
•
•

Any roll acceleration after roll input is removed which requires full
opposite stick to counter
Any bounded PIO which diverges after input is relaxed
Uncontrollable coupled pitch response
Uncontrollable coupled yaw response
Divergent PIO

Heading Capture
Description:

1. Establish the specified initial conditions.
2. Smoothly initiate a level turn at 30 degrees bank angle (15 degrees
in PA1/2 or PA).
3. Smoothly roll out of the turn to capture the desired heading.
Note: Smooth input implies ≈ 1 second to reach 1/4
stick input. If stabilization or PIO problems
develop, lowering the input rate is allowable but
must be cited as pilot compensation and
described.

Success Criteria: •

Maneuver begins within 5 KCAS or 0.02 Mach and 1,000 feet of
specified initial conditions.

Purpose:

•
•

Roll mode characteristics
PIO tendencies

Rationale:

•

Mission representative flying qualities task.

Flying Qualities Criteria:
Desired:
• Acquire intended heading within ± 3 degrees (± 2 degrees in PA1/2
or PA)
• No PIO tendency.
• No coupled pitch motion
Adequate:
• Acquire intended heading within ± 5 degrees (± 3 degrees in PA1/2
or PA).
Controllability:
• Any bounded PIO which diverges after input is relaxed
• Uncontrollable coupled pitch response
• Divergent PIO
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TRACKING TASK
Guns Tracking Exercise
Description:

1. Direct the target aircraft to establish 230 KCAS in straight and
level flight at 20,000 feet Hp and then establish a position
approximately 3,000 feet in trail of target.
2. Verify "speed and angels set" then direct the target to commence a
1.5 to 2.0 g level turn.
3. Establish the test aircraft in a guns tracking position and then direct
the target aircraft to begin mild vertical maneuvering, maintaining
200 to 250 KCAS and a pitch attitude within ±15 degrees of
horizon while the test aircraft attempts to maintain a guns tracking
solution.

Success Criteria: •

Test team satisfaction with maneuver set-up and conduct.

Purpose:

•

Evaluation of high-gain task, applicable to aerial refueling.

Rationale:

•

Mission representative task

Flying Qualities Criteria:
Desired:
• On acquisition, stabilize the heading caret within one and one-half
carets (about 25 mils) of the target within 2 seconds of initial input.
• For fine tracking maintain pipper anywhere on the target aircraft
for more than 3 seconds on each attempt.
• No PIO Tendencies during acquisition or fine tracking.
Adequate:
• On acquisition stabilize the heading caret within one and one-half
carets (about 25 mils) of the target within 4 seconds of initial input.
• Maintain pipper on the target aircraft for more than 1 second on
each attempt.
• No PIO Tendencies.
Controllability:
• Any undesired, unexpected, or unpredicted aircraft response.
• Any PIO which diverges when input is relaxed.
• Divergent PIO.
SIMULATED LANDINGS
Waveoff
Description:

1. Establish On-speed AOA and a -4 degrees flight path angle at the
top of the test altitude band.
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2. Commence the waveoff by advancing throttles to MIL and
maintaining On-speed AOA without re-trimming until reaching 10
degrees pitch attitude in a positive rate of climb.
Variation:
Repeat, but advance throttles to MAX.
Success Criteria: •
•

Initial approach AOA stabilized ± 0.3 degrees (1/4 E-bracket)
AOA held within ± 1.2 degrees (E-bracket) throughout waveoff
maneuver

Purpose:

•
•

Flying qualities on approach and waveoff.
PIO tendencies

Rationale:

•
•

Standard VPA approach.
A 1.2 degrees AOA variation corresponds to top and bottom of the
HUD E-bracket.

Flying Qualities Criteria:
Desired:
• AOA maintained within 1/2 E-bracket
• No objectionable pitch attitude transients or oscillations
• Roll attitude maintained ± 1 degree
• No roll/yaw coupled motion
• No PIO tendencies
Adequate:
• AOA maintained within E-bracket
• Pitch transients ≤ 1 degree and easily damped
• Roll attitude maintained ± 3 degrees
• Any roll/yaw coupled motions bounded ≤ 3 degrees and well
damped
Simulated Single Engine Waveoff
Description:

Waveoff from Simulated Single-Engine Approach:
1. Establish On-speed AOA and a -4 degrees flight path angle at the
top of the test altitude band with either engine at FLIGHT IDLE in
the SSE configuration.
2. Commence the waveoff by selecting MIL thrust on the operating
engine, maintain approach AOA and heading with no more than 5
degrees bank angle into the operating engine until reaching 10
degrees pitch attitude in a positive rate of climb.
3. Terminate maneuver by lowering AOA and reducing the throttle
on the operating engine to FLIGHT IDLE (match the simulated
failed engine thrust setting).
4. Match throttles at PLF.
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Variation:
Repeat with MAX thrust.
Success Criteria: •
•
•

Approach AOA within 1/2 E bracket
Roll attitude ≤ 5 degrees
Inputs maintained until positive rate of climb established
(performance allowing)

Purpose:

•
•

Emergency maneuver technique
Flying qualities evaluation

Rationale:

•

Maintain heading and/or control lateral drift critical during
shipboard waveoff maneuvers.
Approach AOA range realistic for emergency recovery conditions.

•

Flying Qualities Criteria:
Desired:
• AOA maintained within 1/2 E-bracket
• No apparent pitch attitude transients or oscillations
• Roll attitude maintained ± 1 degree
• No roll/yaw coupled motion
• No PIO tendencies
Adequate:
• AOA maintained within E-bracket
• Pitch transients ≤ 1 degree and easily damped
• Roll attitude maintained ± 3 degrees
• Any roll/yaw coupled motions bounded ≤ 3 degrees and well
damped
Controllability:
• Any PIO oscillations bounded and damp out when control input is
relaxed
• Roll attitude maintained within ±10 degrees
• Roll/yaw coupled motions easily controlled
• Sideslip ≤ 10 degrees
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